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ABSTRACT 
 
The events surrounding the Deepwater Horizon disaster have changed the face of 
deepwater operations.  In order to continue drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, the regulatory body, 
the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), has required that applications to 
conduct work in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) include a plan to stop, capture, or contain any 
uncontrolled release of fluids.  The capping and containment systems built and implemented by 
BP during the event are an excellent starting point for minimizing pollution from deepwater 
subsea blowouts, but the system has limitations.  The industry recognizes these limits but is 
currently focused on meeting the regulatory requirements.   
This project will analyze events reported to the BSEE in the past 15 years to define the 
basis for potential capabilities that a capping and containment system should have to minimize 
the volume of fluid released as well as minimize the time needed to regain control of the well.  
The analysis will take a detailed look at 90 events over the past 15 years to determine critical 
factors in the design of a generally applicable capping stack.  The research will also look at 
specific barriers that were used to regain control of the well.  Finally, any factors which 
contributed to the severity of the event or contributed to the success of the blowout response are 
identified.  Based on this detailed review, a list of design considerations for a generally 
applicable capping stack was created. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
In April 2010, the industry and the world were reminded once again that although the 
technology surrounding drilling continues to improve and become safer, blowouts still happen.  
As Figure 1-1 shows, blowouts have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico every year dating back to at 
least 1975.     
 
Figure 1-1: All Gulf of Mexico Blowouts (1975-2010) 
 
The annual number of blowouts over the past 35 years has remained within a fairly 
narrow range (2-10 events).  Additionally, the annual number of blowouts during drilling 
generally follows the drilling activity level as shown in Figure 1-2.   
While it is true that the number of events follows the activity level in a general way,  
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when the number of blowouts per foot of well drilled for deepwater and shallow water is 
examined, an interesting trend emerges (Figure 1-3).   
 
Figure 1-2: Drilling blowouts vs. wells spud in the past 35 years 
 
Figure 1-3 makes the distinction between deepwater and shallow water events.  In order 
to make sense of the graph, we need a definition of deepwater.  For this research, the definition 
of deepwater will be greater than 1,000 ft.  This is the current industry and federal regulatory 
body’s (Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement) standard definition (LaBelle and 
Lane 2001; International Association of Drilling Contractors 2002, 136).  While this is not a 
perfect definition for our research due to the fact that we are focusing on subsea intervention and 
therefore are not focusing on bottom founded rigs and platforms, the number of incidents 
involving floating structures and rigs is too small to be statistically relevant.  This is because 
there are fewer floating structures in the Gulf of Mexico than bottom founded structures.  
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Therefore, the decision was made to examine all events in all water depths and to consider those 
in more than 1,000 ft. as deepwater regardless of the type of platform or rig. 
 
Figure 1-3: Drilling blowouts per million feet drilled per year (deepwater and 
shallow water events) 
 
Figure 1-3 shows that the number of blowouts per foot of well drilled have been fairly 
constant for both deepwater and shallow water events for the past 15 years.  However, there is a 
disturbing trend in deepwater blowouts for the past two years.  This trend has not gone on long 
enough to determine if this is statistically significant or not, but it does point out that while 
shallow water events have remained fairly constant or even dropped in recent years, the trend in 
deepwater is different.  This tells us that focusing on the deepwater as a source for future 
blowouts is a valid concern.  
Blowouts occur on a fairly regular basis, but they rarely cause catastrophic consequences.  
However when they do, the cost can be very high.  In May 2010, the six highest cost spills 
0.00 
0.50 
1.00 
1.50 
2.00 
2.50 
3.00 
3.50 
4.00 
1
9
9
5
 
1
9
9
6
 
1
9
9
7
 
1
9
9
8
 
1
9
9
9
 
2
0
0
0
 
2
0
0
1
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
2
0
0
4
 
2
0
0
5
 
2
0
0
6
 
2
0
0
7
 
2
0
0
8
 
2
0
0
9
 
2
0
1
0
 
Shallow water Deepwater 
2010 - Drilling 
Moratoium 
May to October 
4 
 
(Table 1-1) were (DuBois 2010), the Deepwater Horizon (Macondo) blowout, the Exxon Valdez 
tanker spill, the Amoco Cadiz tanker spill, the Ixtoc blowout, the Kuwait oil field blowouts 
during the first Gulf War and the Aegean Captain/Atlantic Empress tanker spill.  The total 2010 
US dollar impact for all these spills was $51.14 billion dollars.   
Table 1-1: Top Six Oil Spills by Cost 
Name of Event Cost (2010 US Dollars) Amount of Oil Spilled (bbl) 
Deepwater Horizon/Macondo $40 billion# 4,900,000* 
Exxon Valdez $6.3 billion 284,900 
Amoco Cadiz $3.0 billion 1,679,800 
Ixtoc $1.3 billion 3,552,000 
Gulf War (Kuwait Oil Fields) $540 million 11,100,000 
Aegean Captain/Atlantic Empress Unknown 2,123,800 
*Approximated (McNutt et al. 2011),  # (Skoloff and Wardell 2010) 
 The $40 billion is an estimated cost for the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo (Macondo) 
event.  The data comes from Huffington Post in late 2010.  This does not include punitive 
damages assessed by the government and only represents what the company has set aside in an 
escrow fund for the spill.  The cost for the Gulf War spill is remarkably low because the Kuwait 
government was only willing to pay for high priority areas, so many of the areas did not have 
any clean up.  The cost for the Aegean & Atlantic tanker collision is unknown as the collision 
occurred off the coast of Tobago, and much of the product burned or evaporated immediately 
after the collision.  It should be noted that of the top six events only two events are as a result of 
a blowout.  Three of the four events are transportation events.  And the final event can be 
classified as an act of war or terrorism.   
The costs of the Ixtoc and Macondo blowouts exemplify why industry should continue to 
focus on driving the number of blowouts down.  It is notable that the value of all the active rigs 
and platforms in the Gulf of Mexico was estimated by Risk Management Solutions, one of the 
leading catastrophe modeling companies, at $70 billion dollars.  The value of the wells 
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themselves is another $150 billion dollars (Risk Management Solutions 2009).  Macondo is one 
event, and the cost of that event is more than half the value of all the active rigs and platforms in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2009.  This demonstrates the extreme cost of catastrophic blowouts and 
makes the argument that preventing future catastrophic blowouts should remain a priority for 
everyone in the oil and gas industry. 
1.2 Regulatory Response to Macondo 
The capping stack solution to the Macondo event is a wonderful example of a creative 
engineering design solution.  The capping stack is an approach that is often used in response to 
land-based blowouts, but one had never been attempted in a deepwater environment.  The fact 
that the solution was successful is a testament to the people who engineered the capping stack.  
The capping stack was almost immediately incorporated into the BSEE regulations. 
The current regulatory requirements state that an oil spill response plan should be 
included with all new applications to drill or workover wells in federally regulated waters.  This 
response plan should illustrate how the operator will respond to a spill with actual contracts and 
specific equipment to contain the “worst case discharge”.  Part of this response plan is therefore 
required to detail the capping and containment capabilities of the response equipment.   
This requirement led to the formation of two independent containment companies.  The 
concept behind these companies is nearly 300 years old.  It is similar to the 1700’s private fire 
brigades.  These fire brigades would collect fees from commercial properties, and in the event of 
fire, these fire fighting companies would respond and extinguish the fire.  The property owner 
had peace of mind knowing that a dedicated fire brigade would respond in the event of a fire at 
their building (Baker 1970; Anderson 1979).  The two containment companies are Marine Well 
Containment Company and Helix Well Containment Company.  Both companies have members 
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who have bought into the company and will help pay for the maintenance of the equipment so it 
will be available for their use when needed.  Additionally, the member companies have 
additional rights when contracting the services of the equipment in the event of a blowout.  The 
well containment companies are essential for operators to obtain permits for drilling in the Gulf 
of Mexico.   
During the plenary session at a recent deepwater drilling technical symposium a panel of 
individuals representing Chevron, Shell, Marine Well Containment  Company, Helix and the US 
Coast Guard stated that the people within the oil and gas industry they have talked with 
recognize the limitations of the capping stack solution as created by BP, however a detailed 
evaluation to determine what capabilities would be desirable in the subsea capping stack is 
beyond the current industry focus (Achee et al. 2011). 
1.3 Objectives 
1.3.1 Capping Stack Project Objectives 
This research is being conducted as part of the “Functional Design and Sizing for Subsea 
Capping System” project funded by the Gulf Research Initiative (GRI).  The overall goal of the 
project is to provide the answers to the following questions: 
1. What are the minimum, mandatory capabilities for a generally applicable, quick 
response, subsea capping stack? 
2. What supplementary capabilities should be provided by additional modules to 
achieve the functions likely to be necessary for an effective subsea capping, 
containment and intervention system? 
3. What are the required sizes, pressure ratings, and geometries for these 
 components?   
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1.3.2 Research Objectives 
The specific and primary goal of the research presented in this thesis is an investigation of 
blowout incident records over the past 15 years in the Gulf of Mexico to help define the 
operational requirements for an effective capping stack system.  The specific objectives relating 
to determining the capabilities of the subsea capping stack include an examination of past events 
to:  
1. Identify shallow water events and identify what differences would exist assuming 
an equivalent event occurred in deepwater. 
2. Identify and categorize methods used to control and stop the release. 
3. Identify any critical factors which could have contributed to a release of greater 
magnitude. 
4. Identify containment methods used in these events and which were most effective 
in minimizing pollution. 
5. Identify all release points 
6. Identify and categorize leak flow paths to determine the effectiveness of using a 
capping stack  
7.  Identify the relevance of having a well intervention capability built into the capping 
system. 
Meeting these goals and objectives should provide a basis for response systems to be 
designed to minimize the time needed to regain control of the well and minimize the volume of 
hydrocarbons released.  Regaining control of the well would include reestablishing two barriers 
in the well.  These barriers can be either mechanical barriers or hydrostatic barriers.   
A secondary goal is to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on  
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offshore blowouts for use in future research on improving the understanding of, responses to, and 
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills. 
The use of past events to successfully describe future events requires a huge assumption.  
It requires that past events be likely predictors of future events.  There are several circumstances 
where this assumption is invalid, however, for this work, two have relevance.  First, the 
assumption is valid only if technology has not changed significantly.  For instance, the incident 
at Spindletop in Texas in 1901 and others like it would not be good predictors of future 
deepwater Gulf of Mexico events.   
Additionally, the assumption is only valid as long as significant regulatory changes have 
not occurred.  In the late 1970’s, well control training became mandated offshore for the first 
time.  Prior to the late 1970’s, no well control training was required for personnel working 
offshore.  That did not mean that no offshore personnel had well control training, but there was 
no mandatory requirement for it.  This was a significant change in regulations.  Incidents from 
prior to this time cannot be compared to incidents after that time as the changes in the regulatory 
environment are too great.  Because of the changes in technology in the past 20 years as well as 
regulatory changes since the 1970’s, only events in the past 15 years were examined. 
Currently, we are in the midst of another significant regulatory change.  The Drilling 
Safety Rule which became effective on October 14, 2010 significantly changes the regulatory 
environment.  The purpose of this new rule is, “…to clarify and incorporate safeguards that will 
decrease the likelihood of a blowout during drilling operations on the OCS. The safeguards 
address well bore integrity and well control equipment, and this interim final rule focuses on 
those two overarching issues (Department of the Interior 2010) .” 
These are significant regulatory changes, and the value of past events for predicting  
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future events is uncertain.  Past events are nevertheless a potentially valuable basis for 
determining the desirable capabilities of a subsea capping stack and future research focused on 
minimizing the frequency and impact of future deepwater blowouts.  
1.3.3 Research Tasks 
One of the goals of the capping stack project is to answer the question, “What 
supplementary capabilities should be provided by additional modules to achieve all the functions 
likely to be necessary for an effective subsea capping, containment and intervention system?”  
The tasks defined for this research to address that goal and provide a means for addressing 
similar questions in the future were to accomplish the following for each well control or well 
fluid spill incident: 
1. Identify and categorize the operation in progress and the related flow paths for all 
incidents where the well was the source of the fluids released. 
2. Identify and categorize the points where formation fluids were released to the 
environment.   
3. Identify and categorize the relevant attachment points for a capping or containment 
system.  
4. Identify and categorize methods used to control and stop the release. 
5. Identify methods used to capture or contain well fluids in these incidents. 
6. Identify the potential relevance of a well intervention capability in responding to the 
incident.  
7. Identify any critical factors which could have contributed to a release of greater 
magnitude.  
8. Identify any critical factors which did contribute to a release of a lesser magnitude. 
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9. For all objectives above, identify shallow water events which could be equivalent to 
future deepwater events and identify what differences would exist had the event 
occurred in the deepwater. 
A brief description of why these tasks are important and why they were chosen is needed 
to explain how they will help meet the project objectives.  Identifying the operation in progress 
when the release occurred will help define the possible flow paths for the fluids.  The operation 
in progress also helps to define the context in which the response will be made.  For example, the 
equipment and methods needed to address a problem on a drilling well with a rig on location are 
likely to be very different than for responding to a leak from a subsea completion.    
The flow path of the formation fluids is important because the flow path defines the 
possible barriers in the flow path which could be used to stop the flow of formation fluids.  
Additionally, knowing the flow path can help identify the barriers which failed.  The knowledge 
of the flow path can also help identify the options available for stopping the flow. 
Knowing the release point helps to identify the equipment or piece of equipment which 
actually failed.  This helps to identify the equipment the capping stack will need to attach to in 
order to capture or contain the fluids.  Knowing what piece of equipment failed and how it failed 
will help identify if that equipment can be the attachment point, or if another piece of equipment 
upstream needs to be the attachment point. 
The methods used to stop the flow of formation fluids is important because understanding 
what was used in the past can imply which barriers are most likely to be successful at stopping 
the flow of formation fluids in future events.  And help determine if additional equipment is 
needed to implement these methods.  Additional equipment needs will define how long a method 
may take to implement. 
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Knowing what methods have been used in the past to capture and contain flow can imply  
what types of methods can be incorporated into the capping stack design, and what methods 
should be focused on for future study. 
Knowing what vertical intervention methods have been used in the past will help define 
what, if any, vertical intervention capabilities should be included in the capping stack design. 
Critical factors which contributed to increasing or reducing the overall size of the spill are 
expected to be helpful for both identifying factors which should be considered in the design of 
future systems.  Knowing what factors reduced the severity in the past can help reduce the 
severity of future events.  If critical factors from past incidents appear in future incidents the 
risks associated with those factors can be more easily identified and mitigated.   
These tasks will be accomplished by examining the past 15 years of incidents in the Gulf 
of Mexico.  However, it is also relevant to examine past research into this area to determine the 
current states of industry knowledge.  Additionally, the past research was also helpful in 
providing the background into how to create a repeatable, systematic methodology for evaluating 
past events.   
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A review of published research and analysis of blowouts and offshore risks provided an 
excellent starting place for developing the methods to be used in this investigation and for 
identifying what data should be collected from the incident descriptions as well as considering 
conclusions and understanding developed in past studies.  There are several papers which 
examine past incidents and attempt to determine trends from those past incidents.  This was the 
starting place for the literature research.  Next, the subject of each task was researched; operation 
in progress which implies possible flow paths, release points with corresponding attachment 
points, blowout response modes of control or barriers established after a blowout, capture and 
containment of released fluids, vertical intervention and finally what changes occur as a result of 
deepwater operations.  A solid foundational knowledge of each topic was obtained during this 
examination of past research.  
In the early 1970’s just after the Santa Barbara spill (1969), a series of studies were 
published with regard to oil spill statistics (Devanney and Stewart 1974; Stewart 1975; Stewart 
and Kennedy 1978).  The data for these studies was obtained from the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) for the years 1971-1975.  In the 1980’s, there was one report on offshore blowouts 
(Danenberger 1980).  The data for this study was obtained from the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), the original federal agency tasked with obtaining data on offshore blowouts, for 
the years 1971-1978.  In the 1990’s, there were three published papers on blowouts 
(Danenberger 1993; Podio and Skalle 1998; Skalle and Podio 1999).  All these reports used the 
USGS data as well as data from the Minerals Management Service, the agency which took over 
from the USGS.  The years for the Danenberger report are 1971-1991.  For the two Podio and 
Skalle reports, the years are 1960-1996.  It is important to note that most of these papers use the 
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same incidents as the source of their data.  Additionally, there was one book published in 1997 
by Holand which examined past blowouts worldwide (including the GOM) (Holand 1997).  
These papers and book were discussions of trends seen in past incidents.  The Devanney paper 
was a statistical analysis of the volume and number of spills of past incidents.  The first 
Danenberger paper was a listing of the development and exploratory drilling, and non-drilling, 
blowouts.  The later Danenberger paper was a more in depth discussion of past drilling-specific, 
gas blowouts.  The analysis includes contributing causes, duration, water depth, rig type and 
blowout vs. activity graphs.  The first Skalle and Podio paper focused on blowout depth, 
operation in progress, blowout causes, and blowouts vs. activity graphs for drilling blowouts 
only.  The later paper focused on modes of control, duration, pollution, fire, explosion, and 
fatalities.  The Holand book focused on blowout causes and characteristics including ignition 
source, pollution, duration, and flow mediums as well as blowout response failures and an 
analysis of blowouts vs. accumulated operating time.  The analysis of blowouts vs. activity and 
blowouts vs. accumulated operating time provided the starting point for the analysis shown in 
Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3 in the introduction section.   
Skalle and Podio (1998) concluded that approximately equal numbers of exploration and 
development drilling blowouts had occurred in the incidents in their study.  Completion and 
workover blowouts were less frequent than drilling blowouts, but were about equal in number to 
each other.  The fewest number of incidents were wireline blowouts.   
The sections of these studies which are of interest will be addressed in the following 
sections; operation in progress, flow paths, release points and resulting attachment points, 
barriers established by the blowout response efforts, shut in of a well, capture of released 
formation fluids, containment of formation fluids, vertical intervention to control formation flow 
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and conditions in deepwater which are different from shallow water blowouts. 
2.1 Operation in Progress 
The operation in progress when an incident occurs is extremely helpful because only 
certain flow paths are possible during different operations.  Flow paths are an important 
characteristic of past incidents because they help identify the barriers present in the flow path.  
Holand divided blowouts into the operational phase when the blowouts occurred (Holand 
1997).  Holand defined these divisions in his book, however the divisions used in this study were 
included in the data provided by BSEE and were not modified.  No definitions for the divisions 
used by BSEE were found on the public website.   
2.2 Flow Paths of Hydrocarbons During an Incident 
Holand discussed flow paths, and his data captured the final flow path (Holand 1997).  
His flow paths were defined as: 
 “Through the drillstring (or tubing where relevant)” 
 “Through the annulus (the well bore annulus)” 
 “Through outer annulus (between the casing strings)” 
 “Outside casing (outside the outer casing or conductor)” 
 “Underground blowout (subsurface blowout from one zone to another)” 
Holand related these flow paths to operations that were in progress, i.e. shallow gas 
drilling blowouts, deep drilling blowouts, completion, workover, and production blowouts.  His 
data concluded that shallow gas and deep drilling blowouts most commonly have a final flow 
path through the wellbore annulus.  Completion blowouts most commonly have a final flow path 
through the tubing or drillstring.  Workover blowouts most commonly have a final flow path 
through the outer annulus.  Production blowouts are almost equally likely to have final flow 
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paths; through the tubing, through the wellbore, through the outer annulus and outside the casing.   
Petersen et al. (2011) defined another set of flow paths (Petersen et al. 2011).  They 
described four main flow paths “string, string annulus (or wellbore), outside casing annulus 
(named annulus), and rock.”  These can be seen in Figure 2-1.  The definition used in this paper 
comes from Petersen et al (2011).  This is because the two definitions are nearly equivalent, the 
only distinction being between underground blowouts and blowouts outside the casing string.  
The data set for this study rarely had sufficient detail to determine between these two paths, 
therefore the simpler model was chosen.  Petersen et al (2011) uses the flow paths along with 
barrier definitions to analyze the operational well safety during the well design process.   
 
Figure 2-1: Four flow paths (per Peterson et al.) 
 
2.3 Release Points and Corresponding Attachment Points 
Holand discusses locations where formation fluids were released to the environment from 
blowouts (release points) in his book (Holand 1997).  His release points for shallow gas drilling 
were: diverted flow, diverter system line eroded, diverter system line parted, at the drill floor- 
through the rotary, from wellhead on the rig or platform, subsea wellhead, subsea release outside 
the casing, from a subsea crater, and unknown (Holand 1997).  The release points from Holand’s 
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book for deep drilling were: at the drill floor-the choke manifold, at the drill floor-the rotary 
table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring, the wellhead on the rig or platform, no surface 
flow, the shaker room, the subsea BOP choke line, subsea release outside the casing or unknown.  
The completion release points were at the drill floor-through the drill pipe valve, at the drill 
floor-the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring or tubing, or unknown release 
point.  The workover release points were BOP valve outlet (snubbing BOP), from wellhead, 
from christmas tree, at the drill floor-through the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the 
drillstring or tubing, and the tubing valve.  The production release points were from the 
wellhead, the christmas tree, a subsea crater, and subsea christmas tree.   
According to Holand, most shallow gas blowouts had the diverter as the release point. 
Deep drilling blowouts were nearly equally divided between release points at the drill floor-
through the rotary table, at the drill floor-the top of the drillstring, from the wellhead on the 
platform and unknown point of release.  Completion blowouts were nearly equally divided 
between all release points; at the drill floor-through the drill pipe valve, at the drill floor-through 
the rotary, at the drill floor-through the top of the drillstring or tubing and unknown release point.  
Workover blowouts were primarily at the drill floor-through the rotary table.  Production 
blowouts were primarily through the wellhead. 
In 1999 PCCI Marine and Environmental Engineering wrote a paper discussing blowout 
scenarios (PCCI Marine and  Environmental Engineering 1999).  Based on experience with 
subsea blowouts, Wild Well Control Inc. identified for PCCI release points for deepwater 
blowouts.  During drilling, completion and workover operations, the release points were at the 
wellhead connector, the BOP flange/hub connection, the choke/kill connection to the BOP, the 
choke/kill stab on the lower marine riser package (LMRP), through the top of the riser, through 
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the top of the drill pipe, casing hanger seals, and subsea broach outside the wellbore.  For 
producing well scenarios, the release points were: subsea wellhead, flowline, annulus valve, 
subsea broach outside the wellbore, and casing hanger seals.  These release points were 
developed to determine the relative likelihood of each scenario and to rank the consequence of 
each scenario as minor, severe, or catastrophic.  The conclusion was that for drilling, completion, 
and workover operations there were no specific release points that had a high probability, 
however, there was a moderate probability of a blowout occurring with a release at the wellhead 
connector, the choke/kill stab at the LMRP, through the riser, or due to a subsea broach.  
Production operations also had no high probability release points, but a moderate probability 
existed for a release from the annulus valve.  The consequence analysis stated that a catastrophic 
outcome could occur if the leak was through the drill pipe or a subsea broach for drilling, 
workover, and completion operations.  A severe consequence was possible for releases from the 
wellhead connector, the riser, or the casing hanger seals.  For production, a catastrophic outcome 
was concluded to be likely only from a subsea broach and severe consequences likely as a result 
from a release at the wellhead connector or the casing hanger seals. 
Attachment points for a subsea containment system received little attention prior to the 
Macondo incident.  They were discussed only in the context that containment system similar to 
the top hat collection system used for Ixtoc.  It was believed a system could never be sealed to 
the seabed (Burgess and Milgram 1983), sealing a system to subsea equipment was not discussed 
in this paper at all.  In 1985 the top hat type of system was again discussed by Brown and Root, 
but attachment to subsea equipment was not mentioned (Brown & Root Development Inc, 1985).  
A 1999 paper from PCCI Marine and Environmental Engineering discusses subsea attachment 
points in terms of the impracticality of attaching to subsea equipment.  They cite reports from 
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Brown and Root in 1985, and a 1998 draft report from the International Association of Drilling 
Contractors, as well as their own knowledge.  They do indicate that future technology may allow 
for subsea attachment points.  Schubert et al (2011) discuss attachment points in the context of 
installing valves on equipment located on the rig or platform.  The paper indicates that attaching 
to subsea equipment would be difficult, but that it has been accomplished in relatively shallow 
water depths.  No further details were given.  The implication from these papers is that 
throughout the decades attachment to subsea equipment was considered impractical or 
impossible, and as a result, no further research was conducted in this area. 
2.4 Establishing Barriers to Stop a Blowout 
Holand defines barriers in the context of well control operations as; “A well barrier is an 
item that, by itself, prevents flow of the well reservoir fluids from the reservoir to the 
atmosphere” (Holand 1997).  Two independent barriers are required for normal drilling and 
production operations by BSEE (Department of Interior and Minerals Management Service 
2010).   
Table 2-1: Examples of barriers and barrier description (Holland 1997) 
Operational 
Barrier 
“A barrier that functions while the 
operation is carried out.” 
“Drilling mud, stuffing box” 
Active Barrier “An external action is required to 
activate the barrier” 
“Blowout Preventer (BOP), Xmas 
(Christmas) Tree, SCSSV” 
Passive Barrier  “A barrier in place that functions 
continuously without any external 
action.” 
“Casing, tubing, kill fluid, well packer” 
Conditional 
Barrier 
A barrier that is either not always in 
place or not always capable of 
functioning as a barrier.” 
Drill String Safety Valve 
 
When a well is hydrostatically controlled (i.e. killed), the fluid column providing the 
hydrostatic pressure is referred to as the primary barrier and the standard blowout equipment is 
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the secondary barrier (Holand 1997).  When a well is flowing, the barriers closest to the reservoir 
are regarded as the primary barrier and any other barrier in the flow path downstream of the 
primary barrier as secondary barriers (Holand 1997).   
Holand described four general types of barriers: operational, active, passive, and 
conditional barriers (Holand 1997).  Examples of each are given in Table 2-1. 
Well barrier analysis is used in Norway to evaluate potential well designs for blowout 
risk (Holand 1997). Other papers did not discuss barriers per se; instead they discuss modes of 
control.  The modes of control identified did provide a starting set of barriers for the well barrier 
analysis conducted on this data.  Danenberger identified bridging, pumping mud, closing the 
BOP and “mechanical means” for controlling blowouts, which he doesn’t define (Danenberger 
1980) as modes of control.  Kato and Adams (1991) identified seven modes of control occurring 
worldwide, on land and offshore.  They were bridging, relief wells, pumping mud/kill fluid, 
cementing, capping, shut-in and other (undefined) methods.  Danenberger, identified three 
generic categories based on his review of GOM blowouts (E.P. Danenberger 1993).  They were 
“mud/ cement/ mechanical”, bridging, and dissipation of trapped gas.  Skalle and Podio (1999) 
identified eight categories, listed here in order of frequency: bridging, pumping mud, pumping 
cement slurry, closing the BOP, depleting small reservoirs, installing equipment to stop flow and 
drilling relief wells.  They identified capping as an eighth mode of control for onshore incidents, 
but not for offshore incidents.   
2.5 Capture and Containment Methods for Blowouts 
Since 1979, the concept for subsea collection has been based on the riser and funnel 
collection device used at Ixtoc in the Bay of Campeche.  In the aftermath of that blowout, several 
studies looked at the feasibility of such a collection system.  The research was headed by Jerome 
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Milgram at Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a grant from the Mineral Management 
Service’s Technology Assessment and Research Program.  The work completed by Milgram 
included theoretical research as well as some scale model tests (J. H. Milgram and Burgess 1981; 
J. H. Milgram 1982; Burgess and Milgram 1983; J. Milgram and Erb 1984).  There were other 
studies in the early 1980’s however, they are similar in content to the Milgram studies and were 
not used for background for this thesis.  In the mid 1980’s, two papers were written, one 
examined the feasibility of commissioning a tanker as a full time response vessel with this type 
of collection device permanently mounted on the vessel (Brown & Root Development Inc. 
1985).  The second provides a independent, detailed analysis of the specifications for a riser and 
funnel type collection device which could be expected to collect hydrocarbons from a subsea 
release (Hammett 1985).  Since then, there have been two significant works in this area.  The 
first one in 1991 by Neal Adams Firefighters and the second in 1999 by PCCI Marine and 
Environmental Engineering.  Adams provides a background as to what has been attempted in the 
past or designed but never implemented.  This implies some of these concepts have been around 
since before the beginning of the data set, and their implementation could be found in the data to 
be evaluated.  The PCCI report also provides background into what has been thought of in the 
past.  The author of the PCCI report conducted a patent search for subsea collection devices, and 
included the patents discovered in their final paper.  All these papers provide a good starting 
point for potential capture or containment devices which could be seen in the data set if their use 
was attempted and recorded. 
2.6 Vertical Intervention 
Adams and Kuhlman (1993) describe any attempt to control an offshore blowing well 
from a floating vessel vertically located above the blowing well as vertical intervention.  In 
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contrast, Schubert et al. (2004) indicate that vertical intervention means entering the wellbore 
from the mudline or from a vessel above or from equipment located in the sea column or on the 
sea floor, for the purposes of well control.  This would not include a relief well.  Nor would it 
include the removal of damaged subsea equipment, unless that equipment is within the wellbore.  
Therefore it would not include the removal of the BOP but would include the removal of tubing 
or drill pipe within the BOP.  The Schubert et al (2004) definition is used hereafter in this study.  
If there is any ambiguity within this thesis in the meaning or intent it will be clarified.       
One technology used for vertical intervention is a snubbing unit.  The most recent paper 
is from 2010 just prior to Macondo.  It discusses using snubbing units for well control operations 
(Wehrenberg and Baxter 2010).  Snubbing units are systems designed to force pipe into a well 
against pressure.  Traditionally, snubbing units have been used in workover and production 
operations.  A coil tubing unit has similar uses and capabilities.  
Vertical intervention can be applied to enter a well to reestablish hydrostatic control or to 
install some kind of mechanical barrier or repair a mechanical barrier already in the hole.  These 
could include setting a packer, or repairing a surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
(SCSSV).   
2.7 Implications for Deepwater Operations 
Deepwater blowouts present special challenges.  Therefore, the International Association 
of Drilling Contractors has published a 400 page reference providing guidelines and best 
practices for deepwater well control operations (International Association of Drilling Contractors 
2002).  It includes guidelines for planning deepwater wells, well control procedures, deepwater 
equipment, emergency response, and training for deepwater crews.  While the guidelines do not 
typically include supporting technical details, they do support an understanding of some of the 
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 risks currently identified with deepwater operations.   
There are five additional papers which discuss the differences experienced when drilling 
in deepwater versus shallow water or onshore.  The first paper from Nakagawa and Lage (1994)  
discussed deepwater kick detection, difficulties with shutting in a well, killing procedures, 
contingency plans, and emergency disconnects while drilling.  The MMS discussed the 
challenges involved with deepwater spill response including some details from their database of 
well permit applications, production records and past blowouts (LaBelle and Lane 2001).  
Adams et al (2003), attempt to characterize blowout behavior in deepwater environments, 
including problems often encountered and some background research that has been conducted.  
Texas A&M University looked at modeling deepwater blowouts and provided good background 
into unique aspects of deepwater operations as well as methods of controlling deepwater 
blowouts (Noynaert and Schubert 2005; Schubert et al. 2004).  The last paper discusses a drilling 
application for deepwater wells and provides confirmation for some of the data presented in the 
above papers (Fossli and Sangesland 2006).   
2.8 Summary 
Past research related to flow paths, release points and related attachment points, barriers 
used to stop the flow of formation fluids (i.e. modes of control), past capture and containment 
methods, vertical intervention and finally changes to operations when they are conducted in 
deepwater was described.  This information provides a solid foundation for guiding the 
development and organization of the information to be included in the investigation of past 
blowout and spill incidents.  
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3 METHODS 
3.1 Introduction 
The research described in this thesis had two general objectives.  The primary objective 
was to help define the operational requirements for an effective capping stack system.  The 
second objective was to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on offshore 
blowouts for use in future research on improving the understanding of, responses to, and 
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills.  This chapter will discuss the methods developed 
and applied to organize the data from offshore blowouts for these purposes.  It will describe the 
source data, inclusion and exclusions of incidents from the final spreadsheet, a description of the 
additional data needed and how it was obtained, the reason the additional data was obtained and 
how it helped to meet the objectives. 
The evaluation of prior incidents began with collecting the information about those prior 
incidents; however, a simple listing of the incidents would not meet the objectives.  Therefore it 
was determined a spreadsheet would be the most efficient method of presenting the data so it was 
searchable and able to answer the questions needed to meet the objectives.  The objectives ask 
questions about the flow paths of incidents, the release points of incidents, the related attachment 
points, the methods used to stop the flow of formation fluids, including capturing or containing 
the flow of formation fluids, methods of vertical intervention used to stop the flow of formation 
fluids, any factors which reduced or increased the total release of fluids, and how deepwater 
incidents will vary from past shallow water incidents.  Therefore the spreadsheet must be able to 
identify these factors and extract patterns from past incidents.   
3.2 Source of Data 
The source of data on the relevant spills and blowouts was information on the incidents 
reported to BSEE in the past 15 years.  The data used for the study was obtained from the BSEE 
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website.  A complete listing of the website addresses where the data is located is included in 
APPENDIX 2: URL’S OF BSEE SOURCE DATA.  A listing of all incidents reported to BSEE 
is organized by year on the public website.  During the course of the data collection process, the 
data available on the website changed several times.  Therefore, the data that is available today 
may not be the data which was available when this collection of incidents was conducted.  Every 
effort was made to obtain the most up to date information.   
The incidents reported to BSEE were sorted into the following categories;  blowouts, 
pollution events (fluid spills), pipeline pollution events, fires, explosions, injuries and fatalities, 
as well as vessel collisions, crane incidents, gas releases, hydrogen sulfide releases, structural 
damage to vessels, rigs, and platforms, disabled safety systems, muster for evacuation incidents 
and other miscellaneous incidents.  The pollution events were fluid spills of any size from any 
source of fluid.  For example, a vessel which spilled diesel oil as a result of a refueling incident 
was included in this category. 
Obviously, not all of the incidents reported to BSEE were relevant to this study.  However, 
the intent of the data collection initially was to include as many incidents as possible to ensure no 
relevant incident was discarded prematurely.  The incidents which were not included in the 
initial spreadsheet were the crane events, the structural damage to property, the disabled safety 
systems, the muster for evacuation incidents, and the other miscellaneous incidents.  The 
incidents relating to blowouts, pollution incidents, pipeline pollution incidents, fires, explosions, 
injuries and fatalities were initially included.  This resulted in nearly 1,000 incidents.  When 
these incidents were examined, duplicates were discovered.  Any incident which fell into 
multiple categories was listed in both categories.  For example, a blowout which resulted from a 
vessel strike was listed in both the vessel collision category as well as the blowout category.  
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Therefore, the listing of incidents was further refined to include only those incidents included in 
the blowout event, pollution event and pipeline pollution event categories.  Pipeline incidents 
were discarded as the capping stack solution was not likely to be relevant to these types of losses.  
Additionally, pollution events with a spill size less than 50 barrels (bbls) have minimal reporting 
requirements, only the time, date, location, and size of the spill.  As a result, these spills were 
only included if sufficient data was available to be useful.  Therefore, the level of confidence that 
the most relevant spills were captured using this methodology is high.  
The final number of spills in the initial spreadsheet was just under 450 incidents.  Of the 
450 incidents, 86 were blowout events, and the rest were pollution events.  In nearly all of the 
pollution incidents, the fluid spilled was not formation fluids.  For example, many pollution 
spills involved drilling mud being spilled over the side of the rig.  These types of events were not 
relevant to meeting the objectives of this study.  Therefore these incidents were not included in 
the final collection. 
Hurricane events caused a particular complication.  These events are listed as pollution 
events (unless a blowout occurred, then they would be cross-listed).  However, if the hurricane 
damaged a platform and it took a period of weeks, months or years to stop the formation fluids 
from leaking to the environment, the BSEE required the operator to report the spill for each 
separate platform on a quarterly basis until the spill was stopped.  This sometimes resulted in 
several dozen reported incidents for each platform, all the result of one hurricane.  Each platform 
damaged by a hurricane was reported to BSEE as a unique incident regardless of the number of 
wells tied back to each platform.  The incidents had to be combined into a single total pollution 
event on the date the hurricane damage occurred.  This required some creative analysis because 
the data was scattered through the annual spill reports, individual hurricane spill reports and the 
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basic data filed for spills less than 50 bbls.  The URL’s for the hurricane spill reports and spills 
less than 50 bbl are listed in Appendix 2.  After this analysis, a collection of 90 incidents were 
determined relevant for this study.  The details collected from the public database on these 
incidents included the date of the incident, the company name, the type and volume of fluid 
spilled, how the incident was cross-listed (i.e. fire, blowout, explosion, pollution, etc.), lease 
number, operation in progress, area and block location in the Gulf of Mexico, water depth, the 
name of the platform, rig, or vessel involved and a brief description of the incident (typically a 
paragraph). 
One of the first tasks to analyze the data was to determine which of the events had floating 
rig/platforms and which were bottom founded.  The data provided to BSEE did not include 
sufficient detail to confirm floating or bottom founded rig/platforms for all incidents as a result, 
the definition of deepwater used by industry and BSEE, a water depth of 1,000 ft. or greater, was 
used by in this study. 
3.3 Additional Analysis Conducted on BSEE Data  
In order to meet the objectives of, and fulfill the tasks defined for, this study (i.e. flow path, 
release points, etc.) it was necessary to determine additional details about each of these 90 
incidents.  These additional details became additional columns in the spreadsheet, they included:    
 Location of release (i.e. sub-system where the formation fluid first entered the 
natural environment) 
 Flow path from reservoir to location of release 
 Sub-systems where blowout response methods were attached or could have been  
attached (i.e. first sub-system upstream of the location of release where a blowout 
response method could be attached)  
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 Whether vertical intervention was used or could have been used to control the 
blowout, and if attempted, what methods were used  
 Whether the well was shut-in in the course of the well control efforts, and if so how 
was the well shut in 
 Whether the blowout response methods captured any of the formation fluids, and if 
so how was the flow captured 
 Whether the flow of formation fluids were diverted, and if so how was the flow 
diverted  
 Factors that contributed to a more severe release  
 Factors that contributed to a less severe release  
3.3.1 Spreadsheet Columns 
The analysis conducted above was then integrated into the spreadsheet.  In order to make 
the spreadsheet useful, the analysis needed to be sortable.  Therefore, each analysis was reduced 
to 1) a yes or no question, if possible, or if a description was needed, 2) a simple one to two word 
description or 3) a code to describe a combination or sequence of actions or results.  
Additionally, for each analysis a further grouping was needed to extract useful relationships.  For 
example, from the 90 incidents, 65 unique release points were identified.  These 65 release points 
were then grouped into 17 more general categories.  A similar grouping occurred for each 
analysis which did not involve a yes or no response.  For each analysis, the initial unique values 
were retained and a second column was added which contained the larger groupings. 
3.3.1.1 Flow Path 
The Petersen model for flow paths was used for this study.  Figure 3-1is a diagram showing 
the four general flow paths defined by Petersen (2011). 
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Figure 3-1 Flow Paths from Reservoir to Release Point (Petersen et al. 2011) 
 
The wellbore flow path is any flow up the casing, but not inside the drillstring or tubing.  
The string flow path is any flow up the drillstring or tubing.  The annulus flow path is any flow 
of fluids between casing and another casing or casing and the rock, but not traveling through the 
rock (i.e. not an underground blowout).  The rock flow path is any underground blowout 
reaching the sea floor.  These definitions are helpful to this study because these four paths have 
very different barriers along their respective flow paths.  The wellbore and string are designed to 
have flow through them but have different barriers to control or prevent flow.  The annulus flow 
path should generally have a cement sheath along critical sections of the path to prevent fluid 
flow to the surface or sea floor.  The rock flow path has no man made barriers in the rock but 
implies that a barrier in one of the other flow paths failed and allowed formation fluids into the 
earth.  Often the details of the incident were unclear, and the exact flow path was not explicitly 
stated.  However, if well control equipment was used to control the flow, its use sometimes 
helped to determine the flow path.  If however, the details of the incident were such that the flow 
path was unclear, the entry was tagged as unknown flow path.   
The annulus flow path was selected if the flow was outside the deepest string of casing 
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set in the well but still coming to the surface at the wellhead.  Flow coming through a casing 
valve was considered to indicate an annulus flow path.   
On several occasions, multiple flow paths were valid.  For example if there was flow up 
both the wellbore and the string, or if the incident details describe attempting to stop flow in the 
string and wellbore, then both were selected.  
Initially, an analysis with as much detail as the incident description allowed for each flow 
path was completed.  This analysis resulted in 49 unique flow paths.  This number of unique 
flow paths meant that any further analysis of the data would result in data sets of one or at the 
most two incidents.  It was determined this variability was too great to meet the objectives set 
forth in this study. 
3.3.1.2 Release Location 
The location where formation fluids were released to the environment was an important 
factor, because it defines what equipment the capping stack needs to attach to.  A simple diagram 
is the best way to begin describing the release locations (see Figure 3-2).  The figure also shows 
the codes used to define a particular release point in the spreadsheet.    
The release point for each of the 90 incidents was determined and, as stated earlier, 65 
unique release points were identified.  These are the initial release points.  Based on those release 
points, a system of coding was developed to allow the column to be sorted and searched.  1 is the 
release point code for a release from the seafloor itself (i.e. an underground blowout).  The codes 
begin at the seafloor and progress to the platform, as shown in Figure 3-2.  The platform code 
was then further divided to describe the equipment on the platform.  When the 65 unique release 
points were sorted, a total of 13 codes were used.  These are listed in Table 3-1.  
The combined knowledge of the release point and the flow path from the reservoir to the 
30 
 
release location allows determination of the location where a capping system could be attached.    
Vent at Seafloor/ Underground Blowout - 1
Release at Wellhead - 4
Release at Casing above Seafloor - 4.5
Release from surface equipment including: 
•Drilling Floor/Rotary Table - 10
•Wellhead – 10 W
•BOP/Stripper rubber – 10 BOP
•Diverter – 10 D
•Christmas Tree – 10 XT
Equipment Prevented Release - 0
Release at BOP - 5
Diagrams provided by 
Shell Training  
Figure 3-2: Release Points with Coding (Smith 2011) 
 
Table 3-1: Grouped Release Points and Location of Release Points 
Release Point Code Location 
Equipment Prevented Release 0 N/A 
Vent at the Seafloor 1 Seafloor 
Subsea Wellhead 4 Subsea 
Casing above Seafloor 4.5 Subsea 
Subsea BOP 5 Subsea 
Subsea Templates 8 Subsea 
Rig Floor Equipment 10 Surface 
Rig Equipment (not at Rig Floor) 10 S Surface 
Xmas Tree  10 XT Surface 
BOP/Stripper Rubber 10 BOP Surface 
Diverter System 10 D Surface 
Wellhead 10 W Surface 
Chemical Injection Line 10 CI Surface 
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3.3.1.3 Attachment Points 
 A capping stack or containment system must be able to be attached to a leaking well at or 
upstream of the point of release.  Once each release point had been identified, the first upstream 
piece of equipment capable of a creating a barrier or allowing attachment of a barrier or device 
which can create a barrier was determined.  This was the attachment point recorded in the 
spreadsheet.  For example, if the release point was the mud gas separator but the BOP was 
operational then the attachment point selected was the BOP, if however, the BOP was damaged 
or inoperable then the attachment point was the wellhead.  There were multiple incidents where 
the wellhead was located at the surface.  In several of these incidents, the release location was 
below the wellhead but above the seafloor.  In those situations, the attachment point was 
considered the casing above the seafloor.  There were several incidents where a workover was 
being conducted through a christmas tree.  In these incidents, if the tree was intact and 
operational it was selected as the attachment point.   
3.3.1.4 Vertical Intervention 
 For the purposes of this paper, vertical intervention is defined as listed in Chapter 2.  It 
means entering the wellbore with a work string or tools from a vessel above the well, or from 
equipment located in the sea column or on the sea floor, for the purposes of well control.  
Pumping kill fluid through a choke or kill line (i.e. bullheading), or circulation through a 
workstring already in the well does not require intervention.  However, intervention does include 
bullheading fluids into or circulating into the wellbore if drill pipe or a work string had to be 
snubbed into the well to do so.   
The categories in this field include:  
 Yes, vertical intervention was attempted 
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 No, vertical intervention was not attempted 
 Vertical intervention could not have been attempted without removal of obstacles in 
the wellbore  
 Vertical intervention could have been attempted but was not 
 It is unknown if intervention was attempted 
 It is unknown if intervention could have been possible 
If the method of intervention was stated in the incident description, this was also included 
in this field.   
3.3.1.5 Shut-In 
This column indicates whether or not shut-in was attempted.  The choices for this column 
were simple: yes or no.  If the incident description did not provide sufficient detail to determine 
if shut-in was attempted, that is captured in this column as well as “unknown.”  If the shut-in 
resulted in an underground blowout, that detail was not captured in this field.  It was captured in 
the coding of the operational sequence of events, which is explained below.   
3.3.1.6 Capture of Formation Fluids 
This column indicates if there was some attempt to capture formation fluids on the 
rig/platform or vessel in during these incidents.  This column has a yes if the incident details 
discuss capturing fluids in any way.  The definition of capture of formation fluids does not 
include the use of booms or other collection equipment after the fluids reach the sea surface.  
This column only captures whether or not fluids were captured and transported directly from the 
release location to a storage vessel or container.  For example, in one incident the flow was slow 
enough and the process tanks large enough, that the flow was diverted to a process tank on the 
platform and therefore prevented from entering the sea environment.   
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3.3.1.7 Diversion of Formation Flow 
Diverting the flow of formation fluids from its original path is often desirable to protect 
personnel and equipment or to facilitate vertical intervention.  Instances where flow was known 
to be diverted are recorded in this column.  The majority of the events where flow was diverted 
used the standard diverter equipment at the surface.  Common uses were to divert gas away from 
the rig before a BOP had been installed and to deal with gas in the riser above a subsea BOP.  If 
the incident description was not clear if flow was diverted, that was captured in this field as well.  
When flow was diverted without using the surface diverter system, the equipment used to divert 
the flow was described to the extent it was known or could be implied from the incident 
description.   
3.3.1.8 Contributing and Mitigating Factors  
A pollution or blowout incident often involves factors that contribute to or mitigate the 
severity and longevity of the event.  This column was used to capture the details of the incidents 
that could be related to making the outcome of the incident better or worse.  No attempt was 
made to distinguish positive factors versus negative factors because many factors can have both 
positive and negative impacts.  Take for instance the kink in the riser at the Macondo incident.  
This incident reduced the flow of fluids from the riser; however this kink also increased the 
pressure in the wellbore which became a threat to the burst discs in the casing string.  
Additionally, the kink in the riser was an obstacle which had to be removed before the capping 
stack could be attached to the LMRP.  Therefore, this field is used to identify important factors 
that might imply positive or negative impacts and that if not present or compromised, would alter 
the severity of the event.     
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3.3.1.9 Well Bridging  
A common perception is that the most frequent successful control of a blowout is that the 
well has bridged (Skalle and Podio 1998; Holand 1997; Skalle and Podio 1999).  Therefore, this 
is a positive mitigating factor which needs to be investigated, especially to investigate its 
relevance in deepwater.  Adams and Kuhlman(1991) state that a well will often bridge within 24 
hours, although some blowout for an extended period of time.  This 24 hour time limit is 
referenced several times in industry literature (Noynaert and Schubert 2005; Schubert et al. 2004; 
Neal Adams Firefighters Inc. 1991).  Neal Adams Firefighters states that his conclusion is the 
result of over 1,000 blowouts in the database for Neal Adams Firefighters.  The data collected in 
the past 15 years shows that the wells that did bridge (27%) were split about 50-50 between 
those that bridged in less than 24 hours and those that bridged 1 to 9 days after the blowout 
began.  This study is not focused on well bridging; however the data from the past 15 years 
conflicts with the earlier reports which state there is a greater likelihood of well bridging to occur 
within 24 hours.  
The data collected in these fields was used to address tasks 4-8, from Section 1.3.3.  The 
source data can be found online at the URL’s listed in Appendix 1.  The summary descriptive 
data directly from the BSEE website are recorded in the first columns of the spreadsheet.  The 
results of the analysis described herein were recorded in the subsequent columns.  Finally, there 
is a section of columns recording codes to describe the events more completely.  These source 
and meaning of these codes are described below. 
3.4 Reduction of the Incident Description to a Code 
The incident descriptions provide a great deal of information but were not helpful when 
searching for data or for sorting the data into groups to determine relationships between incidents 
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or between events or actions within an incident.  Therefore a simple, logical, repeatable method 
needed to be developed to reduce the words in the incident description to codes which could then 
be searched and sorted on.  Using the model of blowouts as barrier failures and blowout response 
as steps taken to reestablish barriers, the details which needed to be captured from the incident 
description became clear.  For each incident, the response to that incident needed to be captured 
in terms of the attempts that were made to establish a barrier.  For each attempt, there were 
several items of interest which needed to be captured: first, where the barrier was being 
established; second, what type of barrier was being established; third, what type of equipment 
was used to establish the barrier; fourth, how the barrier was established; fifth, whether the 
barrier was established successfully; sixth, why the barrier was not established; and seventh, did 
the barrier stop the uncontrolled flow of formation fluids.  The entire list of responses, or codes, 
used to indicate the locations, type of barrier, equipment used, reasons the barrier was not 
established are given in Appendix 3.   
These codes were the starting point for systematically analyzing the response to all the 
incidents.  The data collected from this sequencing has been helpful in identifying industry 
patterns, and it is expected that it could be useful in identifying patterns within companies and 
determining if there are any gaps in the well control response training.  If known, the time when 
well control specialists were brought on site were identified.  This will help determine what 
actions were taken by on site personnel or specialists.  In 1993, Adams and Kuhlman discussed 
contingency planning and included a brief discussion on response.  They divided blowout 
management into three stages.  Early response includes the predetermined operations which are 
implemented without changes regardless of the circumstances of the blowout.  Second, blowout 
containment operations are designed to mitigate or minimize damage resulting from the blowout.  
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And finally, blowout control, which involves the steps taken by well control specialists to stop 
the formation flow (Adams and Kuhlman 1993).  The current design and specifications of a 
capping stack envision it being implemented in the third stage by specialists due to its size, 
complexity, the need to prepare it for the specific situation, and to transport it to the location.    
An example will help to define the creation and use of these codes.  Because the responses 
to the Macondo event are so well known, that incident will be used.   
The initial steps taken are listed in the Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report 
(BP 2010).  The first well control response begins on page 27.  It states, on April 20, 2010, at 
9:41pm, the following attempt was made: “Diverter closed and flow routed to mud gas separator 
(MGS);…”.  The code sequence for this attempt is: 6D/D/DIV/MGS/N/ATD/N. 
 The first section of the code is 6D; this indicates the diverter system on the rig floor was 
the location of this first attempt to establish a barrier.  The second section of the code is D, this 
indicates the type of barrier being established, it was not a barrier per se, but the flow was 
diverted to maintain personnel safety to allow further operations, in this case, on the rig floor.  
The third section of the code is DIV; this indicates the standard diverter system on the rig was 
used.  The fourth section of the code is MGS, this indicates that the standard diverter system was 
activated, and flow was diverted to the mud gas separator.  The fifth section is N, this indicates 
the barrier was not established.  Since diverting the flow is not a barrier per se, no barrier was 
established.  The sixth section is ATD, this indicates that the attempt was to divert flow rather 
than establish a barrier.  The seventh section is N, this indicates the flow from the well was not 
stopped.  This example shows an initial diversion attempt by the on-site personnel.  This attempt 
is used to show an example of the code when a barrier was not created but the attempt was 
successful at something other than establishing a barrier (i.e. activating the diverter system). 
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The next example is for a successful establishment of a barrier. This occurred much later in 
the well control response.  The well control specialists were on site when this attempt occurred in 
mid July.  The example is for the installation of the sealing capping stack.  The written 
description was: “Install sealing cap”.  The code sequence for this attempt is: 4/M/CAPST 
/STAB/Y/-/Y!. 
The first section of the code is a 4, this indicates the location of the barrier is the lower 
marine riser package.  The second section of the code is M, this indicates the barrier being 
installed is a mechanical barrier, the third section of the code is CAPST, this indicates a capping 
stack was the equipment being used to install the mechanical barrier, the fourth section is STAB, 
this indicates the capping stack was installed in the open position allowing fluids to escape 
through the stack and once the stack was in place the valves were closed.  The fifth section is Y, 
this indicates the barrier was successfully installed, the sixth section is blank because the barrier 
was successfully established, the seventh section is a Y!, which indicates the barrier successfully 
stopped the flow and was the first barrier reestablished after the blowout.   
Using these codes and searching for an “!” for example will result in all the incidents where 
the primary barrier was established.  Then the location, equipment, and success rate of these 
primary barriers can be compared, and relationships can be identified.  Additionally, these codes 
were used to verify what equipment was used to shut-in wells after blowouts and to identify how 
often containment attempts were successful.  The potential uses for this type of coding are 
intended to go far beyond this study. 
3.5 Summary 
The approach used to organize the incident data for this research was centered on creation 
of a searchable, sortable spreadsheet.  The columns in the spreadsheet included the public data 
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from BSEE, additional columns addressing specific questions about the incident description and 
finally, a set of columns with the response sequence coding.  This spreadsheet was then used to 
reveal the most frequently encountered situations and these were used to determine the modules 
needed for an effective capping stack system.  It is intended to also be useful for additional 
research focused on determining the expected distribution of severity and locations for possible 
future blowouts and as a basis for investigating means to minimize the risk of occurrence and the 
impact of possible future blowouts.    
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section is a summary and brief discussion of the results obtained from the analysis 
of the spreadsheet.  Additionally, if the results suggest operational requirements which should be 
considered in the design of a generally applicable capping stack system, it is included here.  The 
topics follow the objectives listed in Chapter 1, Section 3.  Finally, there are results sections 
listed here which are a synthesis of two or more topics, which suggest additional capabilities for 
modules of the capping stack system. 
4.1 Operation in Progress 
The operation in progress when the blowout occurred is the logical starting point for 
looking at the results.  This is how Holand (1999) organized his entire book.  This is because as 
stated earlier, the operation in progress defines possible flow paths.  For different operations, 
different flow paths are possible and impossible.  Table 4-1 shows the number of incidents by 
operation and the relative frequency of that operation.  The relative frequency is the number of 
incidents divided by 90, the total number of incidents.  The operation in progress is a column that 
was provided by BSEE.  These data were not examined or modified from what was available in 
the public data.  These data however can be grouped into slightly more general categories to 
allow trends to be seen.  If drilling, completion and workover operations (including logging) 
were combined, the total number of incidents in this category is 59 incidents with a relative 
frequency of 65.56%.  Production is the next largest category followed by P&A and Post P&A, 
suspended operations (for a hurricane) and finally soil boring.   
The data in Table 4-1 shows very clearly that drilling, workover and completion 
operations are the most likely source of blowouts.  The other item of note is the suspended 
operations category due to hurricanes.  In the past 15 years, there were a total of 95 incidents 
40 
 
where a rig or platform allowed fluids to be released as the result of a hurricane.  Of those 95 
incidents, only 5 are included in this study, including three that are listed in the P&A or Post 
P&A operations.  The other 90 hurricane incidents released fluids from storage tanks located on 
the rig or platform and not from the well.   
Table 4-1: Operation in Progress and Relative Frequency of Occurrence (All 
Incidents) 
Operation No of Incidents Relative Frequency 
Drilling 41 45.56% 
Completion 8 8.89% 
Completion – Gravel Pack 2 2.22% 
Logging 1 1.11% 
Workover 7 7.78% 
Production 17 18.89% 
P&A 8 8.89% 
Post P&A 3 3.33% 
Soil Boring 1 1.11% 
Suspended (for a Hurricane) 2 2.22% 
 
Additionally, what the data in Table 4-1 suggests is that for the capping stack to respond 
to incidents at any point in time in the life of a well, the first priority should be drilling, 
completion and workover operations, and second priority should be production.  This should be 
followed by plug and abandon and post plug and abandon operations.  What this data also 
implies is that the flow paths associated with drilling, completion and workover will be the most 
likely flow paths encountered in these incidents. 
4.1.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations 
Table 4-2 shows the breakdown of the operation in progress for shallow water incidents 
and for deepwater incidents.  The drilling, completion, and workover operations account for 65% 
of shallow water incidents and 67% of deepwater incidents.  Production operations account for 
19% of shallow water incidents and 20% of deepwater incidents.  P&A and post P&A operations 
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account for 12% of shallow water incidents and 13.33% of deepwater incidents.  This implies 
that the operation in progress for deepwater incidents is very consistent with the shallow water 
incidents even though there is a much smaller number (15) of deepwater incidents than in 
shallow water (75 incidents). 
Table 4-2: Operation in Progress Shallow vs. Deep Water Incidents 
Operation   All 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Shallow 
Water 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Deep-
water 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Drilling 41 45.56% 34 45.33% 7 46.67% 
Completion 8 8.89% 6 8.00% 2 13.33% 
Completion – Gravel Pack 2 2.22% 2 2.67% 0 0.00% 
Workover 7 7.78% 7 9.33% 0 0.00% 
Logging 1 1.11% 0 0.00% 1 6.67% 
Production 17 18.89% 14 18.67% 3 20.00% 
P&A 8 8.89% 8 10.67% 0 0.00% 
Post P&A 3 3.33% 1 1.33% 2 13.33% 
Soil Boring 1 1.11% 1 1.33% 0 0.00% 
Suspended (for a 
Hurricane) 2 2.22% 2 2.67% 0 0.00% 
 
4.2 Flow Paths of Hydrocarbons During a Blowout 
Table 4-3 shows the flow paths for each of the 90 incidents by operation.  The wellbore 
path is flow of fluids up the wellbore or the annulus between the wellbore and the string, the 
string flow path is flow up the drillpipe, work string, or tubing.  The string and wellbore flow 
path is parallel flows up the wellbore as well as the string or tubing.  The annulus flow path is 
flow outside the primary casing but between outer casings or casing and the surrounding rock.  
The annulus and wellbore flow path is flow up the wellbore as well as flow through an outer 
annulus.  These flows may be parallel or may be in series.  The flow may have begun up the 
wellbore and when shut in was attempted the flow stopped going up the wellbore and instead 
found a path through the cement or casing.  This approach was used for all instances with 
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multiple paths.  The unknown flow path is when the incident description did not provide 
sufficient detail to determine the flow path.  There are a total of 107 flow paths because each 
individual flow path was counted, therefore the parallel or series flow paths were counted toward 
the total for each of the flow paths they traveled. 
Table 4-3: Flow Paths by Operation with Relative Frequency of Occurrence (All 
Incidents) 
 Flow Paths (Relative Frequency = Num. of Incidents / 107) 
Operation   
Well
bore RF String RF 
Annu
lus RF Rock RF Unk RF 
Drilling/ 
WO/ 
Comp. 
37 35% 14 13% 17 16% 4 4% 3 3% 
Production 3 3% 7 7% 2 2% 0 0% 5 5% 
P&A 3 3% 5 5% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 
Post P&A 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 3% 
Soil Boring 1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 
Suspended 
(for a 
Hurricane) 
1 1% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 1% 
Totals:  45 42% 26 24% 20 19% 4 4% 12 11% 
RF = Relative Frequency 
The data in Table 4-3 implies that the wellbore and string are the most frequent flow 
paths with a total of 66% between the two.  Likewise for the most frequent operations: drilling, 
completion and workover, the wellbore is the most frequent path followed by the annulus path 
and then the string path.  This confirms the conclusion by Holand (1997). For production, the 
most common path is the string, the path the formation fluids are designed to flow in.  The string 
path is followed by the unknown flow path.  For P&A, the most common path is through the 
string, followed by the wellbore.  The flow paths for all post P&A incidents were unknown.  
The number of underground blowouts (rock flow path) which broached to the seafloor is 
4.4% (4/90 incidents).  This statistic is misleading however, because any underground blowout 
which does not broach would not be reported to BSEE, as no reservoir fluids would be released 
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to the seafloor or atmosphere and current regulations do not require reporting of these types of 
underground blowouts.  An examination of 30 years of insurance loss history with regard to 
underground blowouts suggests that operators report losses (equipment, etc.) relating to 
underground blowouts 1.52 times more frequently than losses relating to surface blowouts 
(Adams and Young 2004).  This statistic is for land and offshore events and may not be 
representative of the risk offshore; however, if we assume this statistic is generally applicable 
that would mean that for the 86 surface blowouts (90 less the 4 UGBO) the number of 
underground blowouts could be as high as 131 events.  These two facts suggest that underground 
blowouts may occur more often than suggested by the data.   
Additionally, the rock and annulus flow path most often require a barrier placed upstream 
of the beginning of this flow path in order to regain control of the well.  Sometimes bullheading 
can be used to regain control in incidents with a surface wellhead this is because of access to the 
outer annuli are available through a surface wellhead.   
4.2.1 Implications for Deepwater 
Table 4-4 shows the breakdown of flow paths by water depth with the series and parallel 
flow paths explicitly stated.  For example, there are 8 incidents with both the string and wellbore 
flow paths.  Displaying the data in this manner reveals an interesting trend.  No incidents with an 
annulus flow path (without a rock flow path) have occurred yet in deepwater.  This is may be due 
to the fewer number of incidents in deepwater and does not necessarily reflect a trend of fewer 
annulus flow paths in deepwater.   
Nevertheless, it is logical that a generally applicable capping stack system should be able 
to address flow up the wellbore and string or both as well as flow up through an outer annulus as 
essentially all of these paths pass through the subsea wellhead.  The module that was built to 
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address the blowout at Macondo was attached to the wellhead housing via the BOP and LMRP 
and therefore had the potential to be adapted to have these capabilities.   
Table 4-4: Flow Path of Reservoir Fluids 
Flow Path: Events 
Rel 
Freq 
Shallow 
Water 
Rel 
Freq Deepwater 
Rel 
Freq 
Wellbore Flow Path 31 34.44% 27 36.00% 4 26.67% 
String Flow Path 18 20.00% 17 22.67% 1 6.67% 
String & Wellbore 8 8.89% 6 8.00% 2 13.33% 
Annular Flow Path  13 14.44% 13 17.33% 0 0.00% 
Annular & Wellbore 4 4.44% 4 5.33% 0 0.00% 
Rock Flow Path Only 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Annular & Rock 2 2.22% 1 1.33% 1 6.67% 
Wellbore & Rock 1 1.11% 1 1.33% 0 0.00% 
Annular, Wellbore & Rock 1 1.11% 0 0.00% 1 6.67% 
Unknown Flow Path 12 13.33% 6 8.00% 6 40.00% 
 
In deepwater operations the subsea wellhead does not provide access to outer annuli.  
Therefore, the option for bullheading from the subsea wellhead is not available.  In these types of 
incidents with a subsea wellhead, the only option available would be a relief well or vertical 
intervention.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a subsea capping stack should have the 
capability for vertical intervention to address these types of incidents. 
4.3 Release Points 
The point where the formation fluids were released into the environment is described as 
the release point.  For this study, release points located on the platform or rig account for 80% of 
the incidents, subsea releases 8% and subsea equipment releases 7%.  As expected for the 
surface releases, the wellbore flow path is the most frequent flow path followed by the string 
flow path.  Note that if the actual flow paths involved more than one flow path element, it is 
shown under each relevant column.  For the subsea releases, the most common flow path is the 
annulus flow path, followed closely by the wellbore, string and rock flow paths.  For subsea 
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equipment releases, unfortunately, the most common flow path is unknown.  For incidents where 
the release point is not known, the flow path is also not known.  These incidents with the 
unknown release points were small volume spills and had no incident descriptions.  For the one 
incident where the equipment prevented a release, the flow path was through the wellbore.   
Table 4-5: Release Points by Location and Flow Path (All Incidents) 
Release Point 
All Incidents 
All 
Incidents 
Rel. 
Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown 
Platform Releases 
Wellhead at surface 20 22% 10 3 11 0 0 
Surface Equipment @ 
Wellhead 
18 20% 13 8 0 1 0 
Diverter at surface 12 13% 7 2 3 1 1 
BOP/Stripper Rubber at 
surface 
8 9% 7 2 1 0 0 
Surface Equipment on 
Rig (away from 
wellhead) 
9 10% 4 5 1 0 1 
X-mas Tree at surface 4 4% 1 3 0 0 0 
Injection Line 1 1% 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal: 72 80% 42 23 16 2 3 
Subsea Releases 
Vent @ Seafloor 4 4% 2 0 3 2 0 
Casing above seafloor 3 3% 0 2 0 0 1 
Subtotal: 7 7%      
Subsea Equipment Releases 
Subsea Wellhead 2 2% 0 0 1 0 1 
Subsea Template  2 2% 0 0 0 0 2 
Subsea BOP 1 1% 0 1 0 0 0 
Subtotal: 5 6%      
Unknown Release Point and No Fluids Released 
Equipment Prevented 
Release  
1 1% 1 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 5 6% 0 0 0 0 5 
Subtotal: 6 7%      
Totals:  90 100% 45 26 20 4 12 
Relative Frequency:   42% 24% 19% 4% 11% 
 
The data in Table 4-5 implies that in the majority of these incidents the release point is on 
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the platform or rig.  This is expected because most of these incidents occurred in shallow water, 
and the equipment where fluids likely be released are at the surface.   
Additionally, there were several incidents (see Table 4-5) where fluids were released at 
both the surface, and at the seafloor.  There were also four incidents where an underground 
blowout occurred.  Of those four incidents, two of the underground blowouts resulted from shut-
in which increased the pressure and fractured the formation.  For these incidents, the release 
point changed as a result of well control operations.  The other two began with underground 
blowouts and included some flow up either the annulus or wellbore.  This data suggests that 
shutting in a well can cause an underground blowout.  This suggests that the capping stack 
system should address the possibility of, and the need to minimize the risk of, underground 
blowouts. 
Additionally, two incidents occurred which had a release point subsea and an annulus 
flow path.  These incidents used a pollution dome to collect hydrocarbons while well control 
operations were underway.  The likely reason the pollution dome was used was that attachment 
to the sea floor equipment would have required custom built equipment which would have taken 
time to build and transport to the site.  These incidents imply a capping stack system should 
include the capability to respond to these types of incidents.   
4.3.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations 
The small number of deepwater releases limits the significance of the deepwater data for 
anticipating future release points.  Nevertheless, these data combined with the knowledge from 
shelf operations does imply some potential trends.  Table 4-6 shows the release points by 
location for only the deepwater incidents.  There is a marked difference in location of the release 
point.  Only 40% of the releases occur at the platform or rig, 27% occur from subsea equipment 
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and a further 13% occur subsea and from unknown release points.  These unknown release points 
are incidents without any incident description so no flow path is known for these incidents. 
Table 4-6: Release Points by Location and Flow Path (Deepwater Incidents) 
  Deepwater Wells (>1,000 ft) 
Release Point 
All 
Incidents 
Rel. 
Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown 
Platform Releases 
Surface 
Equipment @ 
Wellhead 
3 20% 3 1 0 0 0 
Diverter at 
surface 
2 13% 2 1 0 0 0 
Injection Line 1 7% 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal:  6 40%      
Subsea Releases 
Vent @ Seafloor 2 13% 1 0 2 2 0 
Subtotal:  2 13%      
Subsea Equipment Releases 
Subsea Template  2 13% 0 0 0 0 2 
Subsea BOP 1 7% 0 1 0 0 0 
Subsea Wellhead 1 7% 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal:  4 27%      
Unknown Release Point and No Fluids Released 
Equipment 
Prevented 
Release  
1 7% 1 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 2 13% 0 0 0 0 2 
Subtotal:  3 20%      
Totals:  15 100% 7 3 2 2 6 
Relative 
Frequency: 
  35% 15% 10% 10% 30% 
 
These data imply there is a greater likelihood of a subsea release from deepwater 
incidents than from shallow water incidents.  The ratio of platform or rig releases to subsea 
releases for shallow water is 80% to 13%, for deepwater it is 40% to 40%.  A contributing factor 
is that much of the equipment located on the rig or platform for shallow water operations is being 
relocated to the seafloor in deepwater operations, which has the potential of creating an even 
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greater number of subsea releases.  This risk could be somewhat mitigated however by the 
expectation that the equipment being moved to the seafloor is being designed for long term, low 
maintenance or maintenance free operations and is less likely to leak or fail than the simpler 
surface equipment. The data supports this because the relative frequency of releases from surface 
equipment which has been relocated subsea does not approach the relative frequency of releases 
from these pieces of equipment when it was on the surface.  For instance, the relative frequency 
of surface BOP releases is 10.7% (8/75), but for subsea the number is 6.7% (1/15).  For the 
surface wellhead the number is 26.7% (20/75) and the subsea wellhead the number is 6.7% 
(1/15).  For the christmas tree on the surface the number is 5.3% (4/75), for subsea that number 
is 0%.  In any event, subsea wells are more likely to result in a subsea release point than a 
surface well.   
The actual subsea release points are known for only 6 of the deepwater incidents.  
Nevertheless, each type of release point is represented in this small sample.  This implies that the 
capping stack system should ideally include the capability to handle subsea releases from all 
possible flow paths and release points.   
The data also implies that while shallow water operations did not encounter subsea 
releases as often, deepwater operations will and a subsea response capability will be needed to 
address these types of incidents. 
4.4 Attachment Points 
Once the release point is identified, the corresponding attachment point was defined as 
the next upstream piece of equipment that was undamaged by the well control event, with the 
assumption that the release point cannot be used as the attachment point.  So for example, if the 
fluids were released at the rotary table and the BOP is at the surface and was undamaged by the 
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well control event the BOP would be the corresponding attachment point.  If however, the BOP 
was damaged by the well control event and that is noted in the incident description then the 
corresponding attachment point would be the next upstream piece of equipment, in this case the 
wellhead on the platform.  In contrast, the release point itself might be an attachment point, e.g. 
the top of the LMRP in the late stages of the Macondo incident.  This possibility was not 
considered in the results shown in tables below or in the spreadsheet.   
Therefore the attachment points listed in the tables below represent the first, undamaged 
piece of equipment where a barrier could be implemented, upstream of the release point.  The 
specific attachment points have been grouped by general location to simplify the presentation of 
data.  The general locations are on the rig or platform, subsea (below sea level but at or above the 
seafloor), or inside the well below the seafloor.  Also, the incidents without sufficient 
information to determine an attachment point are listed as unknown.  There is one incident where 
no fluids were released to the environment, and therefore, attachment of a capping system was 
irrelevant. 
Table 4-7 shows that a little over 50% of the attachment points are on the rig or platform. 
The subsea attachment points (20%) were most often associated with the wellbore flow path.    
An attachment point below the sea floor would be required in 15% of the incidents.  This is 
significant because these types of incidents would require the capability for vertical intervention 
with the well flowing, if that was possible.  If vertical intervention was successful it would be 
much quicker than drilling a relief well.  The incidents in this data set include six incidents where 
it was confirmed a relief well was begun soon after the blowout occurred and in three of those 
incidents other operations (vertical intervention – 2, natural bridging – 1) were eventually used to 
regain control of the well.  This implies the capability for intervention during flow and under  
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pressure would be desirable to minimize the time needed to regain control.   
Table 4-7: Initial Attachment Point by Location and Flow Path (All Incidents) 
Initial Attachment 
Point:  
All 
Incidents 
Rel. 
Freq. Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown 
Platform Attachment Points 
BOP on Platform 23 26% 17 7 4 0 0 
Wellhead on 
Platform 
15 17% 7 4 5 0 0 
Tree on Platform 11 12% 3 9 0 0 0 
Chemical Injection 
Manifold on 
Platform 
1 1% 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal:  50 56%      
Subsea Attachment Points 
Casing 11 12% 6 0 6 0 1 
Subsea BOP 7 8% 6 4 0 0 0 
Subtotal:  18 20%      
Below Seafloor Attachment Points 
Casing below sea 
floor 
3 3% 1 0 2 0 0 
None - 
Underground 
Blowout 
4 4% 2 0 3 4 0 
None - Casing cut 
below sea floor 
3 3% 0 0 0 0 3 
None - Mud 
covering well at 
seafloor 
2 2% 0 1 0 0 1 
None - Soil Boring 
Operation 
1 1% 1 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal:  13 15%      
Unknown Attachment Point and No Release of Fluids 
Unknown 
Attachment Point 
8 9% 1 1 0 0 6 
Equip Prevented 
Release 
1 1% 1 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal:  9 10%      
Totals:  90 100% 45 26 20 4 12 
Relative 
Frequency: 
  42% 24% 19% 4% 11% 
        
 
The flow paths for these incidents are almost evenly divided among all possible flow 
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paths except the string flow path.  This has the potential to further complicate well control 
responses and the specific capping stack capabilities required in these situations.   
Finally, the data from the release points and from this section imply that the rig was intact 
and accessible to the well control crews.  This is important because there are more options to 
control the well after the blowout.  If the rig were lost as in Macondo the options for well control 
are very limited.  
A generally applicable capping stack system should be able to respond to all of these 
scenarios: surface attachment, subsea attachment and attachment inside the well.   
4.4.1 Implications for Deepwater Operations 
The small numbers of incidents which have occurred in deepwater to date limit the 
accuracy which the future expectations can be determined.  Therefore, some general expectations 
are discussed but no specific predictions are made.   
The attachment points for responding to deepwater releases are expected to be 
significantly different than for shallow water incidents.  This is because the response equipment 
for a release from a shelf operation can typically be attached at the BOP or wellhead on the 
platform or rig.  In contrast, the BOP, tree, or wellhead is typically on the seafloor in deepwater.  
Although some deepwater developments like (i.e. TLP, spar) have a high pressure riser and a tree 
at the surface, none of the incidents in this data set had a surface tree or BOP.  In addition, a 
deepwater drilling riser is not designed to handle shut-in pressures and would fail if some type of 
capping stack were to be attached to it.  Therefore, without a major change in technology to 
strengthen the drilling riser in anticipation of a well control event, the majority of the deepwater 
events will result in the need for a subsea attachment point. The drilling riser is present only 
during drilling and therefore during production operations this limitation would not exist.  The 
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data shows that a subsea attachment point was from the string, wellbore, or less frequently the 
annulus path in deepwater.  The desirable attachment points for the deepwater capping stack 
would be subsea equipment (LMRP, subsea BOP, tree), subsea wellhead, or the casing. 
Table 4-8: Initial Attachment Point by Location and Flow Path (Deepwater 
Incidents) 
  Deepwater  Wells (>1,000 ft.) 
Initial Attachment 
Point: 
All 
Incidents 
Rel 
Freq Wellbore String Annulus Rock Unknown 
Subsea Attachment Points 
Subsea BOP 6 40% 5 3 0 0 0 
Umbilical 
Termination Unit 
1 7% 0 0 0 0 1 
Subtotal:  6 47%      
Below Seafloor Attachment Points 
Casing below sea 
floor 
0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 
None - 
Underground 
Blowout 
2 13% 1 0 2 2 0 
None - Casing cut 
below sea floor 
2 13% 0 0 0 0 2 
None - Mud 
covering well at 
seafloor 
0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 
None - Soil Boring 
Operation 
0 0% 0 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal:  4 27%      
Unknown Attachment Point and No Release of Fluids 
Unk 3 20% 0 0 0 0 3 
Equip Prevented 
Release 
1 7% 1 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal:  4 27%      
Totals:  15 100% 7 3 2 2 6 
Relative 
Frequency: 
  35% 15% 10% 10% 30% 
 
An attachment point at the seafloor (40%) or below (27%) would be required for 67% of 
the deepwater incidents, and none had attachment points on a platform or rig.  This supports the 
expectation that deepwater incidents will result in a much higher frequency of incidents requiring 
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a subsea attachment point.  Because of this, establishing a mechanical barrier to flow for 
deepwater incidents is expected to be much more difficult than for shallow water wells.  Four of 
the deepwater incidents were from underground blowouts or from wells which had previously 
been P&A’d.  As a result, these would require an attachment point below the seafloor, which is 
not straightforward.  This is because there is no attachment for the vertical intervention 
equipment.  This implies the requirement for a relief well and a capping or containment system 
while that relief well is drilled.  
4.5 Barriers Used to Stop Formation Flow 
The results from this section come from an analysis of the coding of the incident 
description described in Chapter 3.  The overall organization of the codes was to consider all of 
the incidents as failures of barriers and to document attempts to reestablish barriers in the well.  
As a result, the coding captures the types of barriers and how and where they were placed, as 
well as how often they were successful.  
A successful response to stop a blowout or leak requires establishing a barrier to 
formation flow.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the first barrier successfully established which 
stopped flow is defined as the primary barrier.  The second barrier is defined as, the barrier 
which allowed the well to be returned to normal drilling or production operations or which 
abandoned the well successfully.  
Over 75% of the 90 incidents in this study included details on the primary barrier 
established.  Slightly more than 45% had information about both primary and secondary barriers.  
A possible reason these numbers are so low is that the incident descriptions were more focused 
on the cause of the incident, and the response to the incident was a secondary concern.   
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4.5.1 Primary Barriers 
An average of nearly four attempts was required to establish a primary barrier in shallow 
water events.  There were two general classes of barriers used in the past incidents, mechanical 
and hydrostatic.  Mechanical barriers included such things as BOP rams and annulars, valves, 
cement plugs, packers and natural bridging events.  This is in contrast to a hydrostatic barrier 
which would involve pumping heavy mud or other fluid into the wellbore to reestablish a 
hydrostatic overbalance.  Specific methods include bullheading fluid into the well and 
conventional kick circulation.   
Sixty one or 86% of the incidents with barriers reported had a mechanical barrier as the 
primary barrier.  Ten incidents successfully used a hydrostatic barrier.  Due to the low number of 
incidents utilizing a hydrostatic barrier, a detailed discussion is not included here but the data is 
provided in Appendix 1.   
Table 4-9: Primary Mechanical Barrier by Location (All Incidents) 
 Location Where Barrier Was Installed (61 Incidents) 
Primary Mechanical 
Barrier 
Equipment/Method: Wellbore 
Rig/ 
Platform 
/Riser 
Subsea 
BOP/ 
LMRP 
Rig/Platform 
BOP Total 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Well Bridge 19 0 0 0 19 31% 
BOP 0 0 5 10 15 25% 
Surface Valves (Misc.) 0 11 0 0 11 18% 
Subsurface Safety Valve 3 0 0 0 3 5% 
Packer 2 0 0 0 2 3% 
Cement Plug 2 0 0 0 2 3% 
Diverter used to shut in 0 2 0 0 2 3% 
Pumped LCM/Bridging 
Pill 
3 0 0 0 3 5% 
Casing Swedge 0 1 0 0 1 2% 
Emergency Shutdown 0 1 0 0 1 2% 
Capping Stack 0 0 1 0 1 2% 
Relief Well 1 0 0 0 1 2% 
Totals: 30 15 6 10   
Relative Frequency: 50% 25% 10% 16%   
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Table 4-9 shows the number and relative frequency of each specific type of successful 
barrier for the 61 incidents where the primary mechanical barrier was known.   
The most frequent barrier (31% mechanical barriers) was a bridge, which occurred 
naturally.  The most common barrier implemented by the rig or platform crew was the use of a 
BOP.  The next most common barrier was a surface safety valve.  These two intentional barriers 
represent 43% of the mechanical barriers.  It is interesting to note that these two barriers are in 
place specifically for well control operations.  This would imply the needs for well control 
operations are well known and often implemented.  For the BOP, two-thirds of the time the BOP 
was located at the rig or platform and one-third it was located subsea.  All the surface safety 
valves were located on the rig or platform.  The most frequent location of the barrier when it was 
installed is the wellbore, the second is the rig or platform or riser.  If the well bridging incidents 
are removed from consideration, the rig or platform or riser and rig or platform BOP are the most 
frequent followed by the wellbore and then subsea.   
4.5.1.1 Implications for Deepwater 
The deepwater incidents provide a different perspective on barriers (Table 4-10).  There 
were no occurrences of natural bridging.  Instead the most frequent successful mechanical barrier 
was a subsea BOP.   
Only one of the deepwater incidents used a hydrostatic barrier as the primary barrier.  A 
packer (set in the wellbore) and the Macondo capping stack were the only other equipment used 
so far in deepwater to establish a primary mechanical barrier. 
The lack of natural bridging so far in deepwater may be partially explained by the narrow 
margins between fracture gradient and pore pressure in the deepwater GOM.  This results in 
casing being set at shorter depth intervals and as a result there is a shorter length of open hole 
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exposed and able to create a natural bridge.  Although natural bridging is not well understood, 
the only conclusion reached here will be that there have not been any events of natural bridging 
to date in deepwater.  
Table 4-10: Primary Mechanical Barrier by Location (Deepwater Incidents) 
 Location Where Barrier Was Installed (8 Incidents) 
Primary Mechanical 
Barrier 
Equipment/Method:  Wellbore  
Rig/ 
Platform 
/Riser 
Subsea 
BOP/ 
LMRP 
Rig/Platform 
BOP Total 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Well Bridge 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
BOP 0 0 6 0 6 75% 
Surface Valves (Misc.) 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Subsurface Safety Valve 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Packer 1 0 0 0 1 13% 
Cement Plug 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Diverter used to shut in 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Pumped LCM/Bridging 
Pill 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Casing Swedge 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Emergency Shutdown 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Capping Stack 0 0 1 0 1 13% 
Relief Well 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Totals: 1 0 7 0   
Relative Frequency:  12% 0% 88% 0%   
 
An average of just over three attempts was required to establish a primary barrier for 
deepwater incidents.  This implies that deepwater operations require fewer failed attempts to stop 
flow than shelf operations.  The reasons are not so obvious.  It may be because it was possible to 
achieve a barrier using the existing subsea BOP in five of the eight deepwater incidents.  It may 
also be that the deepwater reports are less detailed or than the increased difficulty in deepwater 
results in fewer, more carefully planned attempts.  It is notable that this average was biased 
upwards by 1.70 attempts due to the relatively large number of documented unsuccessful 
attempts in the Macondo incident, but that the average was still only three attempts.   
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Table 4-10 shows the eight successful mechanical barriers placed in deepwater incidents 
versus the location (effectively the same as the expected attachment point described earlier) 
where that barrier was placed.  In seven of the eight incidents the barrier used most was the 
subsea BOP.  This implies the ability to shut-in deepwater wells with subsea well control 
equipment is of critical importance. 
Macondo represents an important variation in that the subsea BOP was ineffective, but 
the successful capping stack was attached to the LMRP on top of the subsea BOP (i.e. the 
attachment point was actually downstream rather than upstream of the failed BOP.  This was 
possible because there were no leaks from the BOP or the LMRP.   
4.5.1.2 Other Implications for Deepwater Response Systems 
A brief discussion about the importance of the rig or platform remaining intact during an 
incident is pertinent.  There were four incidents where the rig or platform was lost.  Three 
incidents were a result of a hurricane toppling the structure and the fourth was Macondo.  The 
three hurricane incidents were in shallow water.  Macondo was a deepwater operation being 
conducted by a semi-submersible rig with a subsea BOP.  A subsea BOP and other subsea 
drilling equipment are generally controlled by a control cable or umbilical attached to the drilling 
riser.  In the event of a loss of the rig, ROV’s are available; however, it takes time to deploy 
them.  As Macondo showed, the capability of the ROV’s to control the subsea equipment is 
limited.  The low pressure drilling riser used with floating rigs, such as semi-submersibles, 
precludes installing a mechanical barrier in the riser.  Therefore, mechanical barriers can only be 
installed on, within, or by replacing the rig equipment at the sea floor.  This suggests that it is 
highly desirable that the controls for the subsea equipment remain intact during and after an 
incident.  Currently, this means the rig or platform and control lines, umbilical, and riser must 
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remain intact.  The current capping stack designs require the riser and all control lines to be 
removed before the stack can be installed.  Therefore, the capability of retaining control of the 
subsea equipment should ideally be incorporated into the capping stack system.  Since no 
equipment is currently available to perform this function, it is suggested that future research 
investigate a more effective and more fully functional means of controlling subsea equipment 
from the surface without the need for the rig or platform to remain attached to the well.  A means 
to retain full control for existing subsea equipment and any capping stack system from the 
surface would be an important capability. 
4.5.2 Secondary Barriers 
Just over half of the incident reports did not provide information on the secondary barrier 
used.  For the cases with documentation, 63% used mechanical barriers and 37% placed fluid 
into the well was used to establish a hydrostatic barrier.  
Table 4-11: Secondary Mechanical Barrier by Location When Installed (All 
Incidents) 
 Location of Barrier When Installed (26 Incidents) 
Secondary Mechanical 
Barrier 
Equipment/Method:  Wellbore  
Rig/ 
Platform 
/Riser 
Subsea 
BOP/ 
LMRP 
Rig/Platform 
BOP Total 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Cement Plug 18 0 0 0 18 67% 
BOP 0 0 1 0 1 4% 
Blind Flange 0 1 0 1 2 8% 
Valve 0 2 0 0 2 8% 
Packer 1 0 0 0 1 4% 
Well Bridge 1 0 0 0 1 4% 
TIW Valve 0 2 0 0 2 8% 
Totals: 20 5 1 1   
Relative Frequency: 74% 15% 4% 7%   
 
The average number of attempts to establish a secondary barrier was less than two for 
shallow water events.  The meaning of this is that the first attempt after establishing the primary 
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barrier was more often successful in establishing the secondary barrier, regardless of how 
difficult it was to establish the primary barrier.  For 27 of the 35 shallow water events (with 
secondary barrier information) the first attempt to establish the secondary barrier was successful.   
Table 4-11 shows the methods used to establish secondary barriers.  They are very 
different than for the primary barriers. This makes sense since the barrier does not need to be 
established against flow.  A cement plug is used as a secondary barrier 67% of the time. This is 
telling as this would indicate the well is going to be abandoned or sidetracked or plugged back.  
This implies that in 18 of the 90 incidents significant time and expense was incurred as a direct 
result of the blowout or leak.   
In Table 4-11 the secondary barrier is generally located inside the well.  This makes sense 
as typically the well can be reentered and a barrier placed with much less difficulty once the 
primary barrier is established and placement closer to the formation provides a more secure 
barrier.  Of note is the incident where the BOP was the secondary barrier, in this incident the 
LMRP was disconnected by mistake and the BOP could not be operated.  A packer was in the 
well and able to be placed and set, which provided the primary barrier.   
4.5.2.1 Secondary Hydrostatic Barriers 
Hydrostatic barriers make up a greater percentage of the secondary barriers.  The 16 
incidents with hydrostatic secondary barriers are shown in Table 4-12. 
The reason the fluid type was categorized was because the method of circulating the fluid 
was not reliably captured by the incident description.  In most cases the information given was 
limited to the fact that the fluid was circulated to kill the well.  Also of interest is that the 
incidents with secondary barrier information only included P&A operations and drilling, 
workover, and completion operations.  A possible explanation is there are fewer production 
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incidents and therefore a smaller possibility that one of those incidents would include secondary 
barrier information.  An alternative explanation is that the incident description of production 
operations implies a secondary barrier which is not stated, for example surface safety valves or 
other valves on the tree that would routinely be installed, repaired or reinstalled fulfilling the 
function of a secondary barrier.  
Table 4-12: Secondary Hydrostatic Barrier by Location and Operation in Progress 
(All Incidents) 
Secondary Hydrostatic 
Barrier:  Wellbore  
Rig/ 
Platform 
/Riser 
Subsea 
BOP/ 
LMRP 
Rig/Platform 
BOP Total 
Rel. 
Freq. 
All Incidents 
Pumped Heavy Mud 8 1 0 0 9 56% 
Pumped Completion 
Fluid 4 1 0 0 5 31% 
Pumped Seawater 2 0 0 0 2 13% 
Subtotal: 14 2 0 0   
Relative Frequency: 88% 12% 0% 0%   
Deepwater Incidents 
Pumped Heavy Mud 4 0 0 0 4 80% 
Pumped Completion 
Fluid 1 0 0 0 1 20% 
Pumped Seawater 0 0 0 0 0 0% 
Subtotal: 5 0 0 0   
Relative Frequency: 100% 0% 0% 0%   
 
4.5.3 Implications for Deepwater 
A hydrostatic balance was used as a secondary barrier in five of the eight documented 
deepwater incidents.  In four the secondary barrier was established by circulating kill weight 
mud, and one was affected using completion fluid.  Two incidents used a cement plug and one 
used the BOP as mechanical secondary barriers.     
An average of just over three attempts was required to establish the secondary barrier.  
These attempts were apparently also more time consuming than for shelf operations.  This makes 
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sense if the complexity of the deepwater operations is taken into consideration.  This complexity 
adds an additional layer of difficulty in deepwater operations after a blowout.  The exact status of 
each component of the system may not be known.  The complexity of deepwater operations is 
not likely to change, however, as more experience with deepwater systems is gained,  there 
should be a greater understanding of what fails, and how it fails, which should lead to more 
effective responses.  
In seven of the eight deepwater incidents the secondary barrier was placed within the 
well.  This implies that gaining access to the wellbore will be required for the majority of 
deepwater incidents.  For a generally applicable capping stack system this means it should have 
the capability to enter the well to place these secondary barriers.  
4.6 Initial Response: Shut-in versus Capture versus Divert 
The prior section focused on the methods used to establish a barrier to stop or prevent 
flow.  Several attempts were often required before a success was achieved.  This section captures 
if any attempts were made to shut-in, capture or divert flow.  These were sometimes an initial 
response needed before being able to implement a primary barrier. 
4.6.1 Shut-in 
The data from this section comes from two separate analyses of the data.  The first 
analysis determined whether shut-in was attempted.  The second analysis used the incident 
description coding.  The codes were examined to answer the following questions; was shut in 
attempted with any equipment at any time, was shut in attempted with the BOP, how many 
attempts were made to close the BOP, was the BOP the primary or secondary barrier, and was 
any method of shut in (other than bridging) successful in establishing a primary barrier.  The two 
different analyses were correlated so the results matched.   
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Attempts were made to shut-in the well in 63 of the 90 incidents.  As shown in Table 
4-13, attempts were made using the BOP in 30 incidents.  There were 15 successful shut-ins 
using a BOP.  This means that the BOP was successful in shutting in the well for only 50% of 
the attempts.  There were 33 attempts made using something other than the BOP.    In these 
incidents some equipment or method other than the BOP was used to shut-in the well.  The 
equipment and methods used include packers, valves, relief wells, emergency shutdown systems, 
diverter systems used to shut-in the well, drill string safety valves, and cement plugs.  These 
methods were successful in 79% (26/33 incidents) of the incidents where they were attempted 
(see Table 4-13).  This list does not include well bridging, which is considered a passive barrier.  
Overall, 40 out of the 63 total shut-in attempts or 63% of the time the attempt was successful.    
Table 4-13: Shut-in Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents) 
Shut-in Attempted 
Rel. 
Freq. Successful Success Freq. 
Attempts -  BOP 30 33% 16 53% 
Attempts – Other 33 37% 26 79% 
Total Attempts 63 70% 40 63% 
Not Attempted 11 12%   
Attempts Unknown 16 18%   
 
The average number of attempts made to close the BOP when the BOP was used 
successfully to shut-in the well was nearly 3 attempts.  However, for the cases where the BOP 
was never successful in shutting in the well, an average of less than two attempts was made.  
This leads to the question of whether the crew gave up too quickly, if the conditions were too 
hazardous to continue attempting to shut-in the well, or if there were only one or two practical 
alternatives for using the BOP.  Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
would be relevant for future work.  
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The wellbore and/or string flow path had a total of 57 incidents; these incidents used the  
BOP to shut-in 37% of the time, and other equipment 40% of the time.  The annular flow path 
had 17 incidents; the BOP was used 41% of the time, and other equipment 47% of the time.  The 
rock (underground) flow path had 4 incidents and 50% of the time the BOP was used and 50% of 
the time other equipment was used.  The relevant question for this data would be if the shut-in 
caused an underground blowout, and unfortunately the data does not contain sufficient detail to 
draw any conclusions.  It is also unknown if the flow path was known when the decision to shut-
in the well was made, this would also have been useful information to have.  
4.6.1.1 Implications for Deepwater 
The trends seen in initial responses to blowouts in deepwater are somewhat different (see 
Table 4-14).  Shut-in was attempted in only 9 of the 15 deepwater incidents.  There were 7 
successful shut-ins for a 77% success rate.  This rate is greater than for shallow water operations 
where shut-in was attempted.   
Table 4-14: Shut-in Attempts and Success Frequency (Deepwater Incidents) 
Shut-in Attempted 
Rel. 
Freq. Successful Success Freq. 
Attempts – BOP 8 53% 6 75% 
Attempts – Other 1 7% 1 100% 
Total Attempts 9 60% 7 78% 
Not Attempted 0 0%   
Attempts Unknown 6 40%   
 
A possible reason for this difference is that a subsea BOP has more functionality and 
redundancy built into the design than a surface BOP.  Another reason could be the higher 
frequency of incidents where it is unknown whether there was an attempt to shut-in.  
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Additionally, the wide varieties of incidents which have occurred in shallow water have not been 
seen yet in deepwater.  It is uncertain whether the higher success rates in deepwater is significant 
and likely to continue or whether it is an anomaly.  
4.6.2 Capture 
Table 4-15 shows there were only four incidents where flow was captured.  Three of 
these attempts to capture flow occurred after a hurricane damaged the platform.  These incidents 
are typically low flow events, and a portion of the flow was captured using a small pollution 
dome.  One incident was Macondo, where intermittent attempts were successful in capturing a 
portion of the significantly larger flow rates.    
Table 4-15: Capture Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents) 
Capture  Attempted 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Partial 
Capture 
Successful  
Partial 
Capture 
Success 
Freq. 
Captured Some or All of Flow 4 4% 4 100% 
Not Attempted 71 79%   
Attempts Unknown 15 17%   
 
4.6.2.1 Implications for Deepwater 
As shown in Table 4-16, the only deepwater incident where capture was used was 
Macondo.  One incident is not adequate for defining future expectations, however the experience 
gained from Macondo and the solution for capturing high pressure, high flow rates is particularly 
relevant to this study.  While the solution employed by BP was not 100% successful, the device 
was able to capture some of the flow and minimize pollution.  Therefore, the capability to 
capture high pressure, high flow rates subsea is critically important for a subsea capping stack.  
While specific modifications to the device used by BP are not indicated by the data in this study, 
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it is logical that to minimize pollution from future incidents modifications should be made to 
allow more of the flow to be captured.    
Table 4-16: Capture Attempts and Success Frequency (Deepwater Incidents) 
Capture  Attempted 
Rel. 
Freq. 
Partial 
Capture 
Successful  
Partial 
Capture 
Success 
Freq. 
Captured Some or All of Flow 1 7% 1 100% 
Not Attempted 8 53%   
Attempts Unknown 6 40%   
 
4.6.3 Divert 
Flow was diverted in 21 incidents with standard diverter systems (see Table 4-17).  In 
eight additional events, flow was diverted with something other than a standard diverter system.   
Table 4-17: Divert Attempts and Success Frequency (All Incidents) 
Divert Attempted 
Rel. 
Freq. Successful  
Success 
Freq. 
Shallow Water Incidents 
Attempts - Std. Diverter Sys. 17 23% 16 94% 
Attempts – Other 7 9% 2 29% 
Total Attempts 24 32% 18 75% 
Not Attempted 42 56%   
Attempts Unknown 9 12%   
Deepwater Incidents 
Attempts - Std. Diverter Sys. 4 26% 3 75% 
Attempts – Other 1 7% 1 100% 
Total Attempts 5 33% 4 80% 
Not Attempted 4 27%   
Attempts Unknown 6 40%   
 
These eight incidents applied non-standard methods during the incident, mostly in an effort to 
reduce the risk to the personnel attempting to control the well.  In 15 incidents, it is unknown if 
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flow was diverted (i.e. there was not enough detail from the incident description to determine 
what, if anything was used)  
4.6.3.1 Implications for Deepwater 
Five of the 15 (33%) deepwater incidents resulted in diverted flow successfully, whereas 
24 (32%) of shallow water incidents resulted in successfully diverting flow.  This frequency of 
diverting flow is similar to the shallow water events and may not represent a statistically 
significant difference.  However, the inability to shut-in the well at the surface due to the subsea 
BOP and low pressure riser used with deepwater operations may present an increased risk to the 
personnel during deepwater operations, and the only option possible is to divert flow away from 
the rig or to evacuate the rig.  Evacuation leaves the well blowing out with the rig completely 
unmanned and unmonitored.  Therefore, diverting flow is typically preferable.  This situation is 
likely to continue in deepwater drilling operations so a higher frequency of deepwater diverting 
events is likely to occur.  The actual equipment that was used for diverting is less clear.  There 
were four deepwater incidents where the standard diverting system was used, and one event 
where a non-standard diverter was used (diversion when the riser was inadvertently 
disconnected).  Macondo was one incident where diverting was used and the results were an 
explosion, a fire and finally the loss of the rig.  These were a result of equipment being unable to 
handle the gas flows.  This indicates that diverting flow through the mud gas separator (as in 
Macondo) has the potential to cause problems that may lead to the loss of the rig.  This is 
something that should be avoided at all costs.   
4.6.4 Summary and Conclusions for Initial Response: Shut-in versus Capture versus 
Divert 
Shut-ins were attempted in 63 incidents, whereas capture was attempted in only four, and 
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diverting was attempted in 28 incidents.  Therefore historically, shut-in was used to control flow, 
but it was not always successful.  Diverting flow is the response that is used to reduce the risk to 
personnel and allow for subsequent well control efforts.  However, it is generally ineffective in 
limiting pollution.  Currently the goal of diverting flow is not to limit pollution, but to reduce the 
danger to personnel so they can get the flow of formation fluids stopped in a shorter period of 
time.  The goal of shut-in is to stop the flow of formation fluids immediately.  In deepwater 
operations however, due to restrictions as a result of subsea BOP’s and low pressure drilling 
risers, shut-in at the surface is no longer an option.  This therefore implies, the goal of diverting 
flow in deepwater could be expanded to include capturing flow.  This would have the effect of 
reducing the risk to personnel as well as preventing pollution. 
4.7 Vertical Intervention 
Vertical intervention is any reentry into the well during a blowout or blowout response in 
an attempt to reestablish control of the well.  These techniques have been used on land wells for 
a long time with success.  Only eight of the 90 incidents used vertical intervention in an attempt 
to control the well (See Table 4-18).  Four attempts were made to set a packer, barite pill, or 
cement plugs to establish a barrier (See Table 4-19).  In one case, vertical intervention was 
stopped because the area was too hazardous to allow operations to continue and the well was 
ultimately controlled by relief well operations.  Coil tubing units or snubbing units are often used 
in the offshore environment for workovers, and can also be used in well control efforts.  Only 
three incidents in the past 15 years used either a coil tubing unit or snubbing unit for vertical 
intervention.  Fourteen incidents do not contain sufficient detail to determine if vertical 
intervention was attempted.  Sixty eight incidents did not use any type of vertical intervention as 
an attempt to control the well (see Table 4-18).   
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The most frequent flow path when vertical intervention was used was the wellbore flow 
path (see Table 4-20).  This is reasonable since the wellbore path is the most frequent flow path 
overall.   
Table 4-18: Vertical Intervention Attempts (All Incidents) 
Vertical Intervention: All Events Rel Freq 
Vertical Intervention – Yes 8 8.89% 
Unknown vertical intervention 14 15.56% 
No vertical intervention 68 75.56% 
 
Table 4-19: Vertical Intervention Method and Success Frequency (All Incidents) 
Vertical 
Intervention 
Method 
All 
Incidents 
Rel 
Freq 
Successful 
(Primary or 
Secondary 
Barrier)? 
Success 
Freq. Comments 
Spotted Pill 1 12.50% 1 100%  
Coil Tubing Unit 1 12.50% 1 100%  
Snubbing Unit 2 25.00% 2 100%  
Cement Plug 3 37.50% 3 100%  
Unknown VI Type 1 12.50% 0 0% 
Relief Well Was 
Successful 
 
Table 4-20: Vertical Intervention Method by Flow Path (All Incidents) 
Vertical 
Intervention 
Method Wellbore String Annulus Rock Comments 
Spotted Pill 1 0 0 0  
Coil Tubing Unit 1 0 0 0  
Snubbing Unit 2 1 0 0 
One had String and Wellbore 
Flow Paths 
Cement Plug 0 1 2 1 
One had Annulus and Rock 
Flow Paths 
Unknown Method 0 0 1 0  
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The annulus flow path is the next most frequent flow path and the least common was the 
rock/underground blowout flow path.  It is of note that cement plugs were useful across the 
widest variety of flow paths.   
The ability to conduct vertical intervention in the case of the incident with the rock flow 
path, i.e. underground blowout was particularly significant.  It allowed a logical well informed 
response to an incident that could very easily have become worse than Macondo.  The response 
included logging to determine where the subsurface flows were occurring and setting cement 
plugs to prevent those flows.  When additional rock flow paths were discovered, additional 
logging was conducted, and an additional cement plug was placed to prevent any further flows.  
This incident prevented a major hydrocarbon release, drilling fluid was released to the seafloor 
but this incident should properly be classified as a “near miss” rather than a blowout.  
Nevertheless, it was a significant incident in that the actions of the crew were able to overcome 
the threat of a major release.   
This information leads to the conclusion that while vertical intervention is not used very 
often it is something that should be considered as a necessary capability within a capping stack 
system.  A vertical intervention capability that facilitates setting packers, cement plugs or 
running coil tubing clearly has potential applications, especially when the flow path is outside 
the wellbore.   
4.7.1 Implications for Deepwater 
Only one of the 15 deepwater incidents was addressed with vertical intervention (Table 
4-21).  A cement plug was set in that case to establish the secondary barrier.  With only one 
incident, the implications that can be drawn for deepwater are limited.   
One possible reason why the number of vertical intervention attempts is so low in this  
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data set is because the incidents which used vertical intervention successfully were not incidents 
which resulted in any fluid spilled to the environment.  Therefore, the conclusions about the use 
of vertical intervention from simply the use or lack of use of vertical intervention in this data set 
are limited.  However, other analyses included in this chapter suggest that the need for vertical 
intervention is a capability that should be considered necessary for a subsea capping stack 
system.  
Table 4-21: Vertical Intervention and Successes by Flow Path (Deepwater Incidents) 
Vertical 
Intervention 
Method 
All 
Incidents 
Rel 
Freq 
Successful 
(Primary 
or 
Secondary 
Barrier)? Annulus Rock Comments 
Cement Plug 
1 13% 1 1 1 
One had Annulus 
and Rock Flow 
Paths 
 
4.8 Factors Affecting the Success or Failure of the Well Control Response 
An examination of the factors affecting the success or failure of the well control response 
in these incidents was not as useful as originally expected.  However, some factors were 
identified that influenced the severity of these incidents.  
Macondo was the only incident that caused substantial environmental damage and was 
one of only two incidents with fatalities.  There were four incidents which resulted in the loss of 
the rig.  There were no multi-well incidents during this period.  In five incidents, it was identified 
that other wells that might have become involved were successfully shut-in.  The emergency 
shutdown procedure may have also been used to shut-in adjacent wells in other incidents, but this 
level of detail was not in the incident description.  In any event, the ability to successfully shut-in 
adjacent wells has prevented at least one incident of multiple wells releasing hydrocarbons to the 
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environment. 
The following statistics are based on information provided to BSEE by the operators 
regarding the type of fluids released and any resulting fire and explosion on the rig or platform.  
The type of hydrocarbon released was also relevant, gas flow to the surface was common (40%) 
in the incidents involved in this study.  Of these 36 incidents, seven of the incidents had a 
resulting fire, explosion, injury, fatality or loss of the rig.  This results in a relative frequency of 
these types of incidents of 19%.  Of the 54 incidents with oil flows, there were only three 
incidents with a resulting fire, explosion, injury, fatality or loss of the rig.  The relative frequency 
of these types of incidents is 6%.  Flows that are predominantly gas cause little pollution relative 
to an equivalent oil spill or blowout.  This implies that while gas flows result in little or no 
pollution, the risk to personnel and equipment is higher.   
Another important conclusion is that the use of storm packers and SCSSV’s on offshore 
wells has had a major impact in preventing more severe spills and pollution as a result of 
hurricane events.  Of the 95 incidents where a hurricane toppled rigs or platforms, only five 
incidents were included in this study because the other 90 did not release any formation fluids.  
4.8.1 Implications for Deepwater 
Gas in the riser of a deepwater floating rig creates a particularly dangerous situation 
relative to the presence of gas in a well with a surface wellhead and BOP.  Three incidents in this 
study involved gas in the riser of a floating rig.  In two instances, the gas was successfully 
circulated out of the riser without any damage to the riser or rig.  Macondo, where gas in the riser 
was released at the surface and contributed to the initial fire and explosion was an extreme 
example of this danger.  It is expected that the risk of having gas in a drilling riser will continue 
to be an especially dangerous hazard associated with current deepwater drilling techniques. 
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4.8.2 Summary 
The primary factors contributing to the limited number of incidents with severe impacts 
were 1) most flows were oil and not gas which minimized the explosion and ignition risk, 2) 
there were no multi-well releases of hydrocarbons, apparently because of emergency shutdown 
of adjacent wells was effective, and 3) the requirement for SCSSV’s in offshore producing wells 
prevented flow from a number of wells whose surface trees and wellheads were damaged or 
compromised.  
The presence of gas in the drilling riser contributed to the loss of well control and to the 
severity of the Macondo incident.  The risk of gas entering the drilling riser during a well control 
event is a concern in all floating drilling operations that is not an issue when using a surface 
wellhead and BOP because of the increased risk of gas being released on the rig.  The drilling 
riser is not intended to contain a gas flow and generally cannot be closed at the surface to prevent 
a release of gas; the mud gas separator cannot handle large gas flows either.  Although, a diverter 
system is available on floating rigs and is the only defense against gas flows on the rig, it is not 
designed to handle high rates and high pressures.  
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
    
The primary goal of this study was to develop an understanding of incidents reported to 
BSEE over the past 15 years to help define the capabilities which should be included in an 
effective, generally applicable, subsea capping stack system.  The purpose of an effective 
capping stack system is to minimize the time needed to regain control of a blowout and minimize 
the volume of hydrocarbons released.  This was accomplished by focusing the analysis of the 
data on nine topics:  operation in progress, flow path, release points, possible attachment points, 
barriers used to stop formation flow, vertical intervention, and factors which increased or 
reduced the severity of the pollution and reduced the time to stop the flow of formation fluids.  
Additionally, analysis was conducted to determine how the incidents would have been different 
had they occurred in deepwater.  A total of nine individual tasks were completed to meet these 
objectives.   
An additional goal was to provide a comprehensive, searchable compilation of data on 
offshore blowouts for use in future research to improve the understanding of, responses to, and 
prevention of deepwater blowouts and spills.   
What follows is a description of the most critical findings of this study and how these 
findings meet the goals and objectives of this study.   
There is a limitation to these findings.  The total number of incidents in deepwater was 15 
of which 10 involved subsea operations.  The use of subsea BOPs, and wellheads are limited to 
these types of operations.  Since the number of incidents is so small relative to the total number 
of incidents, all findings relating to these types of incidents should be considered preliminary and 
will need to be re-evaluated as additional incidents occur.   
Additionally, some findings of this study do not relate specifically to the objectives or 
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goals but were significant and important, these are included as well.  Finally, any findings which 
resulted in a need for future research were identified and described.    
5.1 Type of Incidents in Deepwater and Resulting Response Capabilities 
5.1.1.1 Operation in Progress 
Drilling, completion, and workover operations were the most frequent the operation in 
progress when an incident occurred (66%).  However, incidents occurred during all phases of the 
life of a well.  The trends for deepwater were very similar to the trends in shallow water.  
Therefore, deepwater incidents can occur at any point in the life of a well.  The capping stack 
system should be capable of responding to incidents during all phases of operation in the life of a 
well. 
5.1.2 Flow Paths 
The wellbore and string are the most common (66%) flow paths for spills and blowouts.  
However, the annulus (19%) and rock flow (4%) paths result in additional complications for 
achieving an effective response.  Also, rock flow paths are likely to be underreported because 
any underground blowouts which did not result in a release of fluids would not be included in 
this data set.  The ability to regain control of any incident involving an annulus or rock flow path 
would require either a relief well or vertical intervention in order to regain control of the well.   
5.1.3 Release Points 
The frequency of subsea release points increases dramatically in deepwater incidents.  
The ratio of subsea to surface releases in shallow water is 5% : 88% while in deepwater this ratio 
is 40% : 40%.  An increase in subsea releases results in an increased need for deepwater subsea 
response capabilities.  Subsea releases in deepwater will likely be high flow rate and high 
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pressure.  Therefore, any effective subsea capping stack should have the capability to capture 
subsea flows from all subsea equipment which would minimize pollution while other well 
control operations are ongoing.  This could be similar to the one used at Macondo.   
Release points from vents at the seafloor are rock flow paths and as such would require 
either vertical intervention or a relief well to regain control. 
5.1.4 Attachment Points 
The attachment point task resulted in several findings of relevance.  In deepwater the 
attachment points are typically (47%) the subsea equipment (LMRP, BOP, subsea wellhead or 
tree).  However 27% of the attachment points are below the seafloor.  These types of incidents 
would typically require a relief well or vertical intervention.  However, to limit pollution a 
capture or containment capability would be needed while the relief well is being drilled.  Or, 
vertical intervention could be used to regain control of the well more quickly which would limit 
the amount of pollution and reduce the time needed to regain control as compared to a relief 
well. 
The attachment points for deepwater operations are restricted to subsea equipment due to 
the low pressure drilling riser.   
5.1.5 Methods to Stop or Control Flow 
The most frequent primary barriers were mechanical (75%) in deepwater.  The most 
common barrier for drilling operations in deepwater was the subsea BOP, a device designed for 
well control operations.  This implies the need to duplicate the functions of the BOP, in a 
standalone piece of equipment.   
Barriers sometimes had to be placed within the wellbore (12%).  Eighty-eight percent of 
the time the secondary barrier was placed in the well.  Therefore, the capability for vertical 
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intervention for these types of incidents would be required.   
Additionally, it was concluded that any equipment which duplicates the subsea BOP 
capability should be able to be controlled from the surface.  While this is not directly supported 
by any one finding, several findings support this conclusion, including duplicating the 
functionality of the BOP, the fact that the BOP and other production well control equipment was 
often used to establish a primary barrier.  While not supported by the findings, common sense 
would dictate that if the installation of a capping stack system removes well control functionality 
during a crisis situation that system is unlikely to be used.  
5.1.6 Shut-In  
In deepwater shut-in was attempted at least 60% of the time and potentially, 100% of the 
time if the unknown incidents did in fact attempt shut-in.  Also, the success rate for shut-in was 
89%.  This suggests that shut-in is an important response capability. 
5.1.7 Capture 
Capture of formation fluids was used in deepwater in an attempt to mitigate pollution 
damage while other operations were ongoing to permanently stop the flow of formation fluids.  
This implies that this capability is required for future deepwater operations.  Additionally, 
several task findings support the capability for capture and containment capability.  Some 
incidents in the past 15 years would have required a relief well to be drilled as the only practical 
solution had these incidents occurred in deepwater.  Therefore, in order to mitigate the pollution 
from these types of incidents, capture and containment would be required.  Finally, in a small but 
significant percentage of past incidents the only possible attachment point was below the 
seafloor.  It would take time to implement this type of solution therefore mitigating pollution 
while those operations are ongoing would be a critical capability.  
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5.1.8 Vertical Intervention 
While vertical intervention was used less than 10% of these incidents the success rate is 
nearly 90%.  Although the use has been minimal in the past, several types of incidents which 
occurred in shallow water would require vertical intervention had they occurred in deepwater, 
and justify the inclusion of vertical intervention capability in future responses.  These include 
annulus and rock flow paths, subsea releases, or attachment points below the sea floor.  
Therefore vertical intervention is considered an important capability for an effective subsea 
capping stack. 
5.2 Types of Incidents in Shallow Water and Resulting Response Capabilities 
For shallow water incidents, the findings support several general conclusions which are 
not specifically related to the capabilities of a subsea capping stack.  In 80% of the incidents the 
release point was at the surface.  Shallow incidents used well control equipment to successfully 
stop the flow of formation fluids in 70% of the incidents.  In shallow water the primary barrier to 
flow was placed at the surface most often, possibly because this is the easiest place to install the 
barrier.  The rig was used in 97% of the incidents to place the primary barrier.  The only incident 
where it wasn’t used a relief well was used to regain control.   
5.3 Useful Capabilities for a Subsea Capping Stack 
A generally applicable subsea capping stack system should include the following 
operational requirements for effectively responding to deepwater Gulf of Mexico incidents:  
1. Ability to respond to incidents at any time in the life of a well.   
2. Ability to shut-in the well 
3. Ability to attach to subsea equipment 
4. Ability to mitigate pollution by capturing or containing the flow of formation fluids while  
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other operations are ongoing to stop the flow. 
5. Ability to install barriers in the wellbore (i.e. vertical intervention).  
6. Ability to maintain control of subsea equipment during application.  
5.4 Additional Observations and Conclusions 
There were several conclusions which resulted from the analysis of the data that are 
important, but not directly related to an effective capping stack system.  
1. The combination of storm packers and/or surface controlled subsurface safety valves 
prevented unintended formation flows after a hurricane over 90% of the time. 
2. Although not directly supported by the data, the implication from the incidents in this 
study is that the greatest opportunity for regaining control after a blowout exists when the 
integrity of the rig or platform remains intact.  
3. Well bridging should not be considered a likely barrier in future deepwater incidents. 
4. Deepwater well control operations are more complex than shallow water operations, 
resulting in increased time needed to control blowouts.   
5. Low flow, low pressure incidents have used pollution domes to successfully mitigate 
pollution damage. 
6. Most often shallow water incidents had release points at the surface. 
7. Most often shallow water incidents placed the primary barrier at the rig or platform. 
8. Gas in the riser which is a hazard specific to deepwater was identified.   
9. Gas flows increase the risk of fire, explosion, injury, fatalities, and loss of the rig.   
10. Knowledgeable personnel on site during incidents were able to significantly reduce the  
severity of two incidents in the past 15 years.   
11. In the 90 incidents included in this study, only two resulted in fatalities. 
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5.5 Creation of a Searchable, Sortable Spreadsheet 
The secondary goal of this study was to create a spreadsheet which is searchable and 
sortable.  Significant time was spent determining how best to structure the spreadsheet so that 
future studies could be conducted using the same data.  The power and flexibility of the coding 
for the incident description captures a large amount of information that is searchable and can be 
sorted.  The correlations between multiple task groupings (i.e. flow path by operation by 
attachment point) demonstrated the successful use of the spreadsheet to answer questions relating 
to multiple critical factors.  It is expected and intended that this basic spreadsheet will be the 
basis for future studies on well control incidents in the Gulf of Mexico.  Therefore, the goal of 
creating a searchable and sortable spreadsheet of incidents in the Gulf of Mexico during the past 
15 years has been accomplished. 
5.6 Recommendations for Future Work 
1. A study, using the spreadsheet created from this study, should be conducted to determine 
if there is a sequence of events which leads to successful well control operations. 
2. An examination of diverter system design should be conducted to determine if they can 
be modified to handle higher pressures and flow rates for longer periods of time 
to allow safe well control operations on deepwater floating rigs. 
3. A feasibility study should be conducted to determine if the capability for subsea diversion 
should be incorporated into subsea BOP equipment for normal drilling operations.  
4. A detailed examination of the bridging phenomenon to determine if it will ever occur in 
deepwater should be conducted.  
5. In deepwater drilling operations the low pressure riser limits options for well control.  An 
engineering study examining potential ways to overcome these limits should be  
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conducted. 
6. A study should be completed to determine how best to control subsea equipment 
including the subsea capping stack system from the surface in the event the rig is lost, 
structurally damaged, or inaccessible due to fire or other hazards.  
7. The capabilities needed to respond to blowouts from multiple wells at a single location 
simultaneously, especially in deepwater, should be explored. 
5.7 Final Thoughts 
A generally applicable effective subsea capping stack system needs to incorporate the 
following capabilities; control of intact subsea equipment, vertical intervention, and additional 
capture and containment equipment.  The system should be designed to handle blowouts during 
the entire life cycle of a well.  Although deepwater blowouts are going to continue, the response 
capabilities of the industry will be improved with the addition of a generally applicable subsea 
capping stack system. 
Other important findings were that SCSSV’s have been extremely successful at 
preventing blowouts after hurricanes, the loss of a rig or platform severely limits well control 
options, well bridging has not yet occurred in deepwater, and finally, deepwater wells result in 
more complex well control operations.    
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APPENDIX 1: CAPPING STACK INCIDENT SPREADSHEET.XLSX 
 
https://docs.google.com/open?id=0B-OlnbEWpjJkZmQyYWlqbGNUaHlLZWZr 
ZFZZMFFLQQ  
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APPENDIX 2: URL’S OF BSEE SOURCE DATA 
 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/spills1996-2011.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Incidents1996-2005.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/Excel/SpillsbblCY1970to2010.xls 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll96.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll97.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll98.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll99.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll00.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll01.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2002.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2003.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2004.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2005.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2006.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2007.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2008.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2009.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2010.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow96.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow97.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow98.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow99.htm 
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http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2000.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2001.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2002.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2003.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2004.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2005.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blow2006.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/blowouts.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/other.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/collisions.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/fatalities.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/firesexplosion.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/injuries.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/HurricanesGustavIke2008GOM.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2005HurricaneKatrina.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2005HurricaneRita.htm 
http://www.boemre.gov/incidents/SigPoll2004HurricaneIvan.htm 
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/acc_repo/districtreports.html 
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/offshore/safety/acc_repo/accindex.html 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF INCIDENT DESCRIPTION CODES 
 
Location along flow path (Drilling):  
1) Well 
1a) Drill pipe/work string/tubing 
1b) Cased Annulus (no cement) 
1c) Cased Annulus (through cement) 
1d) Inside structural casing/drive pipe 
1e) Outside the well 
1f) Inside Casing  
1g) Open Hole  
2) Wellhead housing 
3) BOP 
3a) Main Bore 
3b) Choke/Kill/Booster Lines 
3c) Control Pods 
3d) Other 
4) Lower Marine Riser Package 
5) Drilling Riser 
6) Surface Drilling Equipment 
6CS - Surface Capping Stack 
6 BOP) Surface BOP/ Stripper rubber(coil 
tubing) 
6 W) Surface Wellhead 
6 D) Diverter 
6 M) Mud pits 
6 MP) Mud pump 
6 DRK) Surface Derrick 
7) Ocean/ Atmosphere 
 
Location along flow path (Production):  
1) Well 
1a) Tubing 
1b) Cased Annulus  
1c) Inside structural casing/drive pipe 
1d) Outside the well 
1e) SCSSV control lines 
1f) P&A Cement Plug 
2) Wellhead housing 
3) Tubing Hanger Spool 
4) Tree 
4a) Production Path (Tubing) 
4b) Annulus Path (Monitor/Injection) 
4c) Control Lines 
4d) Other 
5) Jumper 
6) Subsea Manifold 
7) Flowline 
8) Production Riser 
9) Production Equipment 
9 W) Surface Wellhead 
9 XT) Surface Tree 
9a) Production Pipeline 
10) Controls/Pod 
11) Umbilical 
12) Ocean/ Atmosphere 
 
Type of Barrier 
M - Mechanical 
H - Hydrostatic 
D - Flow Diverted 
R - Removal of inoperable/non functioning 
equipment 
I - Installation of equipment 
 
Equipment Used 
BELL - Bell nipple 
BF - Blind Flange 
BM - Bridging material 
BOP - Blow Out Preventer 
BOPA - Annular 
BOPB - Blind rams 
BOPCK - Choke and kill lines 
BOPHCR - HCR Valve 
BOPHL - Hydraulic lines 
BOPP - Pipe rams 
BOPS - Shear rams 
CHK - Choke Manifold 
CONN - Connector 
CONT - Containment system 
CP - Cement pumping Unit 
CS - Capping stack 
CSG - Ran casing 
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CSW - Casing Swedge 
CTU - Coil Tubing Unit 
DIV - Std rig diverter system 
DR - Drilling Rig 
EDS - Emergency Disconnect System 
FRZ - Freeze plug 
GASB - Gas buster 
GASL - Gas lift line 
GAUG - Pressure Gauge 
HNDL - Casing Head Valve Handle 
HNGR - Casing Hanger 
HYDR - Hydraulic lines 
LMRP - Lower Marine Riser Pkg 
NAT - Natural Causes 
NPL - Nipple 
PIPE - Tubing/workstring/drillpipe 
PKR - Packer 
POLL - Pollution dome 
PU - Pumping Unit 
RMVL - Removal of inoperable equipment 
SEAL - Clamp and Packing 
SNU - Snubbing Unit 
SSSV - Subsurface Safety Valve 
SSV - Surface Safety Valve 
TD - Top Drive/Kelly 
TIW- TIW Valve 
VLV - Valve (eg. BPV, MV, WV, CV, gate 
valve) 
VT - Venturi Tube 
WELL - Wellhead 
WIRE - Wireline tools 
XTRE - Christmas Tree 
 
How barrier was placed/installed/created? 
BULLF - Bullheaded Fluid 
BULLP - Bullhead Pill 
CV - Closed Valve 
INST - Installed equipment 
MCV - Manually closed valve 
OBS - Insert obstruction into flow 
OV - Opened Valve 
P&A - Plug & Abandon 
PCMP - Pumped completion fluid  
PHM - Pumped Heavy Mud 
PILL - Lost circulation material spotted 
PLACD - Placed over leak source 
POF - Placed over flow (no seal) 
PSW - Pumped Sea water 
RECMT-Remedial Cementing 
RV - Valve replaced/repaired 
RW - Relief Well 
SLCSG-Seal Casing (as with a packer) 
SP - Set Plug 
STAB - Stab open valve then close 
UBLOW - Underground Blowout 
WB - Well Bridged 
WIN - Water Influx 
BM - Bridging Material 
 
 
Was barrier established 
Y - Yes 
N – No 
SLW - Slowed flow 
 
If no, why? 
AB - Abandoned 
ATD - Attempt to divert flow 
FLOW - Flow through barrier (flow cut) 
FTC – Unable to close 
LEAK - Leak around barrier 
OBS - Barrier failed to close due to obstruction 
UTA - Unable to install barrier 
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